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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The decline of a g r i c u l t u r e s h a r e in gross! domestic product 
and total employment has been the moat consistent structural 
change observed in the economic history of developed countries 
and in cross-section comparisons between poor and rich countries 
(Chenery and Syrquin, 1977). This trend is frequently explained 
in terms of the decline in income elasticity of food as Incomes 
rise (Engel's Law), discovery of synthetic substitutes for agri-
cultural products, and rapid technological change in agriculture 
in response to growing scarcity of land. Both external and in-
ternal economic policies, however, may have unduly hastened the 
declining importance of the agricultural economy among less , 
Paper presented at the workshop on the Impact of Economic 
Policies on Agricultural Development sponsored jointly by the 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) and the 
Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research and 
Development (PCARRD) oh-March 25-26, 1983, Tagaytay City. This 
is a preliminary draft of the integrative report drawing on-the 
various studies written for the research project with the same 
title and sponsors as the workshop (see reference list A ) . 
The substantive comments and assistance of John H . Power and 
Gerald A . Nelson are gratefully acknowledged. " j 
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•«lev<»; >.pt'., t. i.Kiii i" i - First., l h e i'»;-nrTiiily li eavy pr.:> ion of 
the f u t ura st'fcior in developed •••ountries limits the potential 
ex:»4ir'. market j'or agr i cui t era l prodiHis of L'DC'f,-. Second, domestic 
eccn.vir.ic policing pursued by l.UC's arc. typically designed to 
accelerate this process of structural transformation by favoring 
the i-uiustr.fii sector. 
• h e f !".(.• t,s o n p r o m o t e r . . • .i<k'.\' t r: i i ;*.u t i o n v j p r o t e c t i o n o f 
t h e i .Tiostio BiArkot in tlu* ;'hi i i p p i n o in»M t v a r d« vi-l o - w e n t s t r a t e g y , 
C o r exfi'.'iipl c , .may h e iiu c-r;>rl
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 { c d a:, s u c h an ,j[M/r u.jih. A & r ir.u i ? ui v 
w a s s : rnp 5 y v i e w e d a s u f O u r f i n y r u l e , tr, s u p p l y f o r e i g n o x c h a n g e , 
riiL-aj- foori, c a p i t a l r e s o u r c e s f o r ihi.s e f f o r t . 
iiy the ir.te 1960a, it became. <• Jortr that thi s unbalanced growth 
ks.r?»»'>iy which -iegJec-ted rijeveIorurieht of tii<? agricultural sector 
twi-.; n'Jf ieu c; s-jstnino'i, ov^rjr.ll cc3iit«:t,: c prosiest.. Morocvor, the 
jithU-^ t r ji»i ptrotmfcion policjets eneoiirnKed industr ies which were rclfi-
l ;v. y ir-uf ficient, capiral intensive, located mostly near larfiii 
u r f t a r e a s an<! serving primarily demands'fron the -domestic market, 
()v« t?;e other Is irid, as ci.o I .ind frontier was approached, the capital 
4j.vi*'atiner.t s needed to produce the food and foreign exchange tc 
hWjv.vort furtiu-r indust n a l i i o n c "forts had increased. Chronic 
balance 01 payaerirs difficulties, pt-riudic food crises, slow growth 
of ru.ployir.oiu, ana uneven distribution of income over the pant two 
dei. dcy have b.-en problems with Lhi 3 development strategy. 
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The growing concern for equity and eaployisent, the bleak balance 
of payments prospects, the serious food grain crises in 1973, and 
the promise of substantive gains in productivity with the new rice 
technology have led to what seems to have been a stronger explicit 
focus cn agricultural development in tut 197Cs* compared to the past 
two decades. At the same tine. hovivv r, the government policies 
affecting incentives to investment and c u t p h a v e still strongly 
favored industry over agriculture. 
At the start of the 1980's, the long-run program structural 
adjustment adopted to meet the challenge of a changing world 
economic environment, as well as a changing domestic resource 
structure, ha3 been mainly directed towards the industrial and 
energy sectors. Although the tariff reform and other measures 
to liberalize imports trill lower overall protection of manufac-
turing and hence domestic currency overvaluation, indirectly 
benefiting the agricultural sector, the. role of agriculture and 
review of policies affecting the sector has so far been largely 
overlooked in these efforts, 
The socio-economic disparities between the urban and rural 
sectors remains substantial. Average income of rural families 
is half that of urban families. The proportion of rural families 
with incomes less than the accepted minimum subsistence level is 
nuch greater than of urban families. Not surprisingly* rural 
levels of health, nutrition, education, and housing are consist-
ently lower due parc.ly to lower incomes but also to snail public 
social services expenditures in these areas C'tengahas, 1976). 
Admittedly, an important reason why the Philippines is poor 
is because of limited capital and, in the rural sector, of limited 
land resources- But precisely because these resources are especially 
scarce, the efficiency by which they are utilised should be a primary 
concern of any development strategy. The central question is the 
degree to which w e are approaching the best possible use of these 
resources to improve economic welfare, especially that of the rural 
population. This research therefore asks: whether and to what 
extent the Philippines has a comparative advantage in various 
agricultural activities, and to what extent economic policies have 
aided or thwarted the realization of that comparative advantage. 
Our analysis of economic policies is comprehensive and differs 
substantially in its approach from previous studies of agricultural 
policies in two major respects. First, most policy studies are crop-
specific and frequently pertain only to the rice economy. This 
study encompasses the entire agricultural sector in order to evaluate 
the overall agricultural policy strategy and the differential impact 
of policy across agricultural commodities and between agriculture 
and non-agricultural sectors. Second, most policy studies cover 
only those specific to agriculture and each subsector. This study 
attempts to include, as well, the important effects of the broad 
macro^conomic policies — exchange rate and protection policies » 
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fiscal and monetary policies. Past analysis of macrotsc&nciiiic 
policies often have been conducted from the perspective o£ the 
industrial sector neglecting their pervasive effects on tha 
allocation of resources aad distribution of income with respect to tha 
agricultural sector. 
After a brief historical review of the agriculture's performance 
in the economy in Chapter 2„ the next three chapters are dssyeted to 
an analysis of economic, policies affecting agriculture. The emphasis 
is sa acortcasic policies directly impinging on price r els tranships* 
i.e.., price intervention policies, to be covered in Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 4, credit policies evaluated in terms of how th^ae might 
change the direction of incentives generated by price intervene.iuft 
policies. An Attempt is marie in Chapter 5 to examine public e:q:a>iditures 
for agriculture particularly those for irrigations, research and 
extension which affect: agricultural prices by raising productivity. 
The purpose, however, is to infer the pattern of government priorities 
rather than to quantify their impact. Although the focus of the 
analysis is on the inpact of policy on the efficiency of resource 
allocation, the indirect impact on income distribution will alsc be 
discussed. 
To infer to what extent economic policies have promoted or reduced 
economic efficiency. Chapter 6 presents estimates of domestic resource 
cost to evaluate the comparative advantage of selected aajox agricultural 
conaoditias. Chapter 7 examines the impact of price intervention policies 
on intersectoral capit&l flows. The final chapter provides a summary and 
* 
a discussion of the policy implications. 
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Table 1. Selected economic indi cators in tlie Fhilippl 1955-8C 
1 9 5 ^ m - 6 3971 1976 197* 
Share of population jr. 
rural area .7 !> 1U 73 72 71 70 
Shnre of NDF 
Agri rul uire*-' 3f; 33 2W 33 31 29 
Tn^iis try.c/ 2 ^ 2 4 2
C
. 20 31 
Setvice;; i<2 •U2 <VZ &1 40 
Manufacturing 16 18 IS i s 20 20 
Share of l,ahor Force 
Agriculture (A f-1 55 Vji SO 51 
IDIIuri ry 1 15 15 16 15 
Serv i cv s 30 3'- 3 4 34 
Ajjr-icuJ turc's «hare 
of «:xport:v'l' B-'i SJ 73 5G 
Agriculture's si-are 
of importrjl-' 22 22 22 J a 13 in 
Exports to CHP ratio 
a /_. , 
— Three year average centered at the year shovm. 
—^Agriculture includes craps, livestock and poultry, finticry
t 
and forestry, 
c/ 
— •Industry, includes manufacturing, mining,, cons truck) on, elect-
ricity gas and water. * / 
— Agriculture is defined broadly to ir.rlocis agricultural products 
wlii eh liave some tnannf ar:t ur i n^ con tent such as processed food, coconut 
oil , plywood, and so forth. 
.Sources: Pb ' 1 ne St -i! i si. i ca 1 Yearbook, National Economic and 
Ueveiopnu-nt Board, 1980 and 1481. 
reign Ttdde Statistics, National Census and Statistics 
01f ice. 
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Table 2. fii'-ctcral growth 
!955 to 1980, Cp 
rates of 
c-rcent). 
value added in the ?hi2i ppines, 
1956- . 
1 901--
1 9 f> 1 -
196 6 
1966-
1 Q7 1 
1971-
15 76 
1976-
1979 
1956-
1979 
Industry 4.7 5.8 5.2 6.9 6.8 5 f 1/ . 4. 
ManuTact ur ing ft. 3 5 > 2 5.6 7.1 5.8 c.O 
Services 4.3 4.4 4.6 5.2 4.8 4.8 
Agr i cu11 urc 
Forestry 
3.6 
9.8 
4. » 
5.9 
3.5 
4.0 
* 
-4.6-V 
H * / fc/ 
-l.CF* 
4. Q 
2.B*' 
Fishery 2.9 4.9 7.7 4.6 1 T J . rf 4 .8 
Livestock f. 
I'oul t ry -2.6 6.M 1 .')• 1.7 4.2 i 
Crops U . h 1. 3 b.o s.:} 
— iintl years arc three year averages c~ntert!ii .it tiip ypjsr shown. 
Ttr. ^  l o w xrout.h rr. te w a s d <->'.; i n p a r e t o u n d e r r e p o r t i n g o f 
l o g e x p o r t s ( P o w e r ;>n<i TiiTnam.-nji) . 
S n u r c c : P h i l i p p i n e S t a t i m t i r a1 Y e a r b o o k . , '-'acional E r c n o m j c a n d 
DvtveJ r.»pm'«nt A u t h o r i t y . 
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7 percent aniuai growth of che manufacturing sector was below that 
experienced ay ofrier ASEAN countries and much below that of the 
rapid»y growing East Asian countries. 
The performance of the agricultural sector has improved over 
time whereas a marked slowdown of manufacturing growth occurred 
beginning the tnid-seven ties, The growth rate of agricultural crops 
rose from the mid-1960's, surpassing the growth rate of manufac-
turing in the 1970's. The agricultural sector al.-o seem.s to have 
performed remarkably well in recent years, nr leant relative to the 
manuiacturir.g sector, despite the second oi1 prirc shock and the 
worldwide recession which caused a sharp drop in world prices of 
the :*,ajor agricultural expert commodities. Data for 1980 and 1981 
indicate an even faster growth rate of the agircu]turn! sector as 
a whale — 5.0 and 3.6 percent compare-! to only 4.2 and 3.4 percent, 
respectively, for manufacturing. 
Agriculture's share in employment fell from 61 percent in 1956 
to about 50 percent by the mi<1-1970*s and has changed very little 
sine** then. Tin's decline was compensated by an equivalent increase 
in the service sector rather than in industry where the employment 
share remained constant at 15 percent throughout the whole period. 
Thus, the higher growth rate of industrial output was not accompanied 
by a similar pattern in sectoral lahor nhsorption, an indication of 
r * 
the £Xc.e6sivel\ capital intensive nature of industrialization. 
Instead*, tin? growing labor force has been nominally employed in the 
10 • 
service arivi agrirul turai sortors where wages are mere flexible and 
sel f"i.-.rv,-->Jcymcnc is prevalent, but in the process constraining 
growth in-the labor productivity in those sectors. 
The inward-Joo'xing character of development policies is ref-
lect eO in the slow growth 'U. export to gross national product ratio 
{13 to 20 percent over 25 years), which again is currently lowest 
.in Lilt' ASEAN region.- In countries where a mora export-oriented 
industrial Ktrategy has bee- adopted such nr. South Korea, the ratio 
increased six fold within a span of 1 fi year's (And»-: » S9P2). 
The shift in'the sectoral source of exports, has been more 
significant rhr.n those of value added and omp loytn.-nf , Fric.r to the 
mi d- 19f*.0' s, agriculture's slurf- >n tot-:! exports was about 86 per-
cent and imports was abou: 22 percunS : by 1930, i'he«c fl:;rcs declined 
sharply tv> 50 percent and 10 percent » respectively. 
Growth and Composition of Agricultural Production 
Woile the agricultural sector in genera] performed noderately 
well in the postwar period, growth of gross vslue added of the 
major commodity groupp has been uneven (Table 2). livestock and 
poultry show the lowest growth rate (2.5 percent), even less than 
the rate of increase ol population. After expanding rapidly in 
the lV^ti's and l^Ml's, -forest prodnr t i on data indicate a marked 
decline as a result of the log export quota instituted in 1975 
to conserve forest resources.—^ 
The higher growth rates of agricultural crops raised their 
share relative to the other commodities — 5<"> percent to 65 percent 
of grass value added in agriculture (Fig. 1). Though average 
growth rate of fishery is relatively high, its share did not change. 
Livestock and poultry accounted for about 25 percent In the 1950's 
but ica share has fallen lo 15 percent in 1980. The contribution 
of forestry also decreased from 18 percent at its highest in 1963 
to on";y 5 percent in 1980. 
-•ice, coconuts, sugarcane, and corn are historically the four 
leading crops comprising 70 to 85 percent of gross value added for 
agricultural crops and of harvested crop area. Rice still is the 
most important single crop in terms of value (252) and hectarage 
(302), Growth of rice production has accelerated since 1966 when 
the modern seed-fertilizer technology was introduced and irrigated 
area expanded (Table 3). 
Corn contributes the smallest share to crop value added (about 
10 percent) among the principal crops. However, it is a close second 
to rire in term* of hectarage since it occupies mostly low yielding 
- Data on t'-.irestry output is also significantly understated 
in later years due to underreporting of log exports. 
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Fi}>. 1. Distribution of .iv.rioil t urai Kross value added in constant 1972 
prices by commodity groups in the Philippines, 1955-J980. 
Table 3. Annual gr 
I w o v t h r a t M ' o t . g r i c l t i H l crop*. in the Philippines, 1955-1980 
" 7 1 7 , . 1 9 6 6 - 1971- 1976- 195*-
Ric< 
S n ^ r 
Coconut* 
2.9 
7.2 
8. 
5. ? 3.1 5.7 3.5 
2.8 2.7 2 - f. 3.1 5.8 
1 > 7
 6.7 - I ' -
-0,2 5.3 1-9 
13.9 B.Q 
i'End yearns re three year averages centered at th« y«*r shewn. 
Source: P h i l c l o n a l ^ ^ *
u l h o r I
' 
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mn r^i -1 arti'iK. It,*; growr'r. /Ate is also relatively high especially 
in recc.it years due niain.v tn increasing demand for corn as feeds. 
The major export crop!., I'oconut and sugar, account for 15 
to 25 percent, respectively, of crop value added. While coconut 
output expanded r.»re rapiillv in the I9?0',s than in the previous 
perioi;, thin was nut true for .sugar. The growth rate of sugar 
wit.-; mtu'h lower rompared m the previous peliod (S.6 percent) when 
virtually .ill fitig.tr e x p m t s went to the highly protected tip. sugar 
evi rket. There wa«* also a t- lift in land use from grainH to export-
able » ro|v.s a f t e / the 19^2 devaluation (Treadgo \ d and Moo ley, I')f>7). 
This explains in part the ren.irVahle increase of other food crop* 
f row the mid~19M)'s, m.iinly bananas and pineapp' decent 
years coffee and mangoes for export. The production effect on 
coeen.-L was not felt until the 1970's. 
C h a n g n g P a t t e r n o f A g r i c u i 'iral E x p o r t s 
t!p to the end of I^f
1
'
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 , more th.-.'i BO percent of export 
lt-ceiiUs was earned hy agriculture (Table 4). Coconut, Kiigfir, 
and forest products cont r i hut ed t hree-fourt h.s of the export 
trade Ah.ica and, t<» a l«<s>.-r extent, tobacco were also signi-
ficant in the earlier year<. Ih.- share of. coconuts and sugar 
dec 1 i:':ed during this pefio.' hut expansion of forest products 
sustained tin* predominance ..»!' agriculture in the export trade. 
. Similar!}, tne sharp drop inthe reported share of forestry exports 
since 1V70, was a major fai'.or in the declining export share of 
. agri cal i ure ir. the 19 70V:. 
Table 4. Value of Philippine agricultural exports by leading commodities, 1955-1980 
(FOB million CSS), 
.iriirr-j-j t 
1965*' 1966 1971 1976 
86.2 84. 72.7 
% ,of agriucltural to 
,total exports 
i —^Three vear averages centered on the year shown 
—^Figures in parenthesis are percentage of agricultural exports. 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, National Census and Statistical Office. 
62.9 
19 79 
Agricultural exports 369. 2 630. 4 800. 2 1,681. 6 2.259. 3 
Cocotiut products 167. 0 b/ 
217.7 2?0. 3 589. 0 919. 0 
(45. 2)— (32.0) (28. 8) (35. 0) (40. 7) 
Sugar products 102. 0 146.7 211. 3 535. 7 359. 7 
(27. 6) (21.6) (26. 4) (31. 9) (15. 9) 
Forestry products 48. 3 228.0 264. 7 311. 3 475. 3 
(iJ. 1) (33.5) (33. 1) (18. 5) c i . 0) 
Fruits and vegetables 8 . 7 13.7 42. 3 141. 0 214. 0 
(2. (2.0) (5. 3) (8. 4) (9. 5) 
Abaca 35. 7 . 21.7 16. 0 26. 0 35. 7 
(9: 7) (3.2) ' ( 2 . 0) (1. 5) (1. 6) 
Tobacco 4, 7 38.0 16. 0 31. 0 31. 0 
(1. 3) (5.6) (:. 0) (1. 8) (1. •4) 
Fish 0 . 1 0.5 5- 6 28. 5 9B. 5 
(0. 0 3) (0.1) (0. 7) (1. 7) (4. 4) 
Others 2. 7 U . 1 14. 0 19. 1 126. 1 
( 0 . 7) (2.1) (1- 7) (1. 1) (5. 6) 
Total exports 428, 3 806.0 1,101. 2 2,673. 0 4,604. 6 
49.1 
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Nevertheless, tin- growth rate of agricultural exports in the 
)97()',s was actually higher than in the previous period because of 
the fast growth of new agricultural exports, specifically bananas 
and pineapples under fruits and vegetables, shrimps and tuna under 
fish and fish preparations, and coffee under the category, others. 
The importance of agriculture in export trade, however, began to 
decline, with the more rapid increase of non-traditiona! manufac-
turing exptn t s from tin- late 1960Vs. 
Chapter III 
PRICE INTERVENTION. POLICIES 
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The overall effects of government policies on agricultural 
product and input prices or economic, incentives have not received 
adequate attention in the Philippines. The fact that small farmers 
are rational and price-responsive is already amply demonstrated in 
the literature (Schultz, 19(>A). Hence, price relntionships nmnnn 
crops, between agriculture and non-aj*ri culture, nnd between product 
nnd input prices have important consequences on agricultural in-
centives r»nd the allocation of resources. A complex set of govern-
ment market interventions intended to m-hi».»vc many different and 
conflicting objectives, e.g. , food self-nufficinncy, low food prices, 
stable prices, higheT farm income, rnore government revenues, and 
promotion of agricultural processing,-influence these price relations. 
•Price controls, export taxes, trade quotas, import tariffs and 
pricing policies of national marketing agencies are commodity speci-
fic policy instruments directly affecting relative prices. It 
should be emphasized, however, that macro-economic policies affect-
ing foreign exchange rate and credit or interest rates may be as 
important in determining relative profitability in agriculture. 
In analyzing the impact of both these trypes of policies, it was 
also useful to distinguish between their effects on domestic agri-
cultural incentives in relation to the world and those in relation 
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to the non-agricultural sector with whom a p i c u l t u r e competes 
for resources. 
Impact of Commodity Sperific Policies 
To evaluate the impact of economic policies on domestic 
agricultural incentives, actual domestic prices of agriculture! 
outputs and inputs are compared.to those prices which would heve 
prevailed w i t h o u t - prira intervention policies. Since most 
agricultural commodities are t r a d a b l e and the Philippines can 
ger.rrally be considered a small country relative to the inter-
national marVet, this undistorted price can be approximated by 
the v»or Id or border price, i.e., FOB unit value for exportables 
and CIF unit value for importables converted at the official 
exchange rate*— 
Three summary indicators have been used; nominal protection 
rates (NPR) and implicit tariff (IT) measure the percentage differ-
ence between domestic and border prices of agricultural output and 
inputs, respectively.-*' Care was taken to define these prices at « 
-^World prices are not affected by changes in imports or exports 
in the small counti" ease 
f™.» 
— NPR * 
! P 
— - i x ton; IT 
v\ 
1 
L
P
b 
x 100; where Pfc denotes 
border price, T d ^ domestic price and the superscripts o and a 
refer to output and inputs, respectively. A distinction « made 
between the concept of nominal protection and implicit tarrif because 
Philippine government policies often create a difference xn the domes-
tic pt?ce- from the point of view of the producer and t h « t o f t h e u -
r 
of the same product. This is, of course, not true for border pr.ee. 
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comparable point in/the marketing chain to insure that the observed 
divergence in prices are m u s e d by government market interventions 
and not by real marketing costs. The third indicator is the effect-
ive protection rate which provides a net measure of the impact" of 
government interventions on both output and intermediate input 
prices by taking the percentage difference between value added at 
domestic and at border price's. All border prices atv converted fit 
the official exchange rat»'s in these measures. 
Aiming the commodity specific policies, tariffs, import controls 
through quotas or licencing, and other forms of import re»trict 
raise domestic over border values resulting in positive NPK's and 
JT's. On the other hand, price controls, production tax, export tux, 
export quotas and other types of export restrictions reduce domestic 
relative to border price. Without these government interventions, 
NPR's for exportables are zero because they have to compete in the 
international Market anil policies, therefore, which restrict exports 
lend to negative Nl'R's and IT's. A negative implicit tariff on 
agricultural inputs provides an incentive while a negative nominal 
protection rate, a disincentive to agricultural production. The net rffe 
or the effective protection rr.le (F.PR) will depend on the relative 
value c.f NPR and IT for agricultural products and inputs, respect-
ively, and the value added ratio. A high (low) EPF. promotes (dia-
couj-n^s) expansion of a sector. 
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Nominal Protection.on Agricultural Output 
The policy instruments driving a wedge between domestic and 
border prices in agriculture generally differ from those in 
manufacturing where the tariff structure and indirect sales tax 
are the main tools of policy. Aside from forest products, the 
only tax on sales are a one percent tnx on agricultural output 
from which snu.ll forms are exempt and a one percent miller's 
tax. The protective effect of import tariffs which do exist 
for most agricultural products applies only to o limited segment 
of domestic agriculture. Trade protection on percent of 
agricultural products which are exportable ia redundant. Because 
of prohibitive marketing cost, anoth.-r percent are essentially 
non-traded such as roots and tubers, some fruits and vegetables, 
fresh fish, and so forth. Wheat, soybeans, sorghum, milk products 
and a few others which are not locally produced in any significant 
amounts have relatively low t a r i f f s . Moreover, quantitative trade rest-
rict ions, din-ct nnvrmnv.it involvement in marketing, export taxes, 
price controls and other types of policy instruments tend to be 
the most important instruments
 Q
r p r i c e interventions in Philippine 
agriculture especially during the p.ist decade. 
Except for rice, corn, and su
B
«r, there were few commodity 
specific policies in the 1950'a and 1960's. Import controls .in 
the 1950's and tariffs in the 1960'a nay have potentially provided 
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protection to a limited number of minor import-competing agri-
cultural products, there were fc-w attempts to intervene in the 
production and trade of export crops except in the special case 
of sugar and briefly by an implicit export tax through restrict-
ions in foreign currency conversion for export receipts as a stab-
ilization measure after the 1962 devaluation. 
Government regulation of the agricultural sector has notice-
ably increased in the 1970
s
s. While some policies were motivated 
partly by the intent to promote agricultural development ar.d 
balanced sectoral economic growth, many policies were instituted 
at least initially to cushion tbe impact on consumer prices of 
the floating exchange rate in 1970 and the oil and food grain crises 
in 1973. 
Rice and corn, being staple food grains, have historically 
been the objects of direct price interventions. The government's 
short-run impact on domestic price levels has been principally 
through monopoly control of their international traded-
7
' Main-
taining low prices of grains for consumers as well as as&uring 
adequate price incentives for producers are the twin objectives 
of rice price policy. In 1972, the functions of the Rice and Corn 
- -
— Over the long-run, public expenditures on irrigation, re-
search, and extension ,-iffect domestic prices by shifting the 
supply function rightward. 
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Administration .which administered the government marketing opera-
tions were broadened to rover all grains under a new name, the 
National Grains Authority, Since 1981, marketing of all food 
crops is theoretically supposed to be regulated by the National 
Food Authority (NFA). In addition to influencing rice and corn 
prices,the NFA now directly determines domestic pricing of wheat grains 
& feeust uf fri-yel low corry^oybean meal, ar.d sorghum for which it 
has-monopoly control-on imports. NFA's marketing activities 
in other food crops, through the Food Terminal, Inc., and Xadiva 
Centers, have been mainly aimed at providing Sow food prices to 
target poor families. 
.Government intervention in sugar was initially motivated by 
the need to administer the (IS sugar quota. A domcntic quota system « 
was established for an orderly distribution among the domestic 
producers of the Philippine export quota to the highly protected 
US market. In the 1960's, this was also designed to reduce the 
burden on domestic consumers of the higher export prices resulting 
from the 1962 devaluation and the greater US quota allocation 
afforded by the Cuban crisis. With the end of the US sugar quota 
policy in 1973, sugar trading was effectively nationalized, first 
under the Philippine Exchange, Inc. (PllILEX) and currently under 
the National Sugar Trading Association (NASUTRA), which has become 
* 
rhe sole wholesale buyer and seller of sugar in both the domestic 
and international market. Under this system, producers are paid a 
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composite price which is derived as a weightred average of the 
export price* the domestic wholesale price^ and a domestic 
reserve price, 
With the floating of the exchange rate in 1970, export taxes 
from 4 to 6 percent were imposed at> a stabilization measure but 
since then have been continued as a convenient means of taxing 
agriculture. A higher rate is levied on traditional exports of 
copra and centrifugal sugar (6/1) and lugs (10%) to promote new 
and greater processing of agricultural exports. Most of the other 
are «,
 / 
agricultural comroodities/subject to a A percent export tax.— 
Between 1973 and 1975* additional export premium duties were tem-
porarily levied to siphon off part of the gains from higher world 
prices. 
In the case of roconuts, the problem of protecting domestic 
consumers from the sharp rise in coconut' oil prices in the world 
market provided the immediate reason for the Coconut Consumers 
Stabilization Fund (CC5K) levied in 1973, The implicit tax rate 
of this levy varied with the world price of copra but on the average 
represented just less than I wenty(20) percent of border prices. 
- These are processed coconut products molasses, abaca, bananar., 
pineapple products, tobacco products, molasses, shrimps and prawns, 
lumber, plywood and veneer. 
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Although the tax is col letted at the miller's level, the incidence 
hf 
of the tax is clearly at the farm level.-
In addition to tlie levy, Unicorn's control of more than two-
thirds of copra trade further lowered the farm price of copra. 
Ironically, the estabiishment of UNICOM in 1979 was funded mainly 
by the levy receipts and was tne policy response to the over-
capacity which existed in the coconut oil milling industry that 
wan partly a result of investment incentives offered by the Board 
of Investments. With the drop in world prices of coconut oil in 
1982, the levy was finally lifted only to be replaced shortly by 
a policy of banning copra expnrts to protect coconut oil mills, 
another example of a common policy response that sacrifices the 
farm in favor of the industrial sector. 
'Oggic.g is the other exportable commodity where the govern-
mcMit has increasingly intervened during the 1970*6. The government 
— About 20 percent of the revenues from the tax supports the 
direct subsidy on domestic consumption of coconut oil products. 
The remainder is supposed to finance development programs in the 
roromit industry such as replanting, vertical integration and 
scholarships. Research to date shows that only a small segment 
of the coconut industry actually receives the benefits from these 
programs (David, V. 1977). On the other hand, the gains from the 
replanting program are uncertain. Jt is not known how well hybrid 
seeds will perform under diverse Philippine conditions. Further-
more, small </ocon«it farmers with no alternative source of income 
have been hesitant to face the prospect of waiting for three years 
to harvest a first crop. At least for the short-run, the CCSF and Cocofund levies may be considered a tax on he i n d u s f -
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should of-course, regulate the forestry sector because forest is 
owiK-d by Horii-ty and unregulated cutting of forest has adverse 
environmental consequences to the total economy. Because of the 
growing concern for conserving forest resources, the general 
push foT greater processing of raw materials in the 1970's has 
coincidentally been strongest in the forestry sector. Aside 
from the differential export taxation of forest products ii.e., 
107. on logs and 4Z on lumber end plywood*, ait increasingly stringent 
log export ban which further lowered the domestic price of logs 
has been in effect since "<975. 
' Three
 B
eneraS pattern* emerge from the estimatee of nominal 
protection rates (Table 5 ). First, average nominal protection 
rates in agriculture are much lower than the 1974 estimates by 
- Medal la and Tower for manufacturing (excluding the major processed 
agricultural products). This is explained partly by the large 
share of exportable and non-traded agricultural commodities. 
Other crops and fishery were assumed to be non-traded. Although 
legal tariff rates are as high as 500 percent for fish and some 
other crops, fragmentary evidence indicates that these relatively 
high protection rates are not fully realized. Some items in 
these two categories are in tart exported and penalized by the 
A percent export tax. Poultry has been the most favored agricul-
tural c o m m o d i t y through tariff protection. Nominal protection 
T a b le 3 . T r e n d t in n o m i n a l p r n t e c t i m ; r a c e s o f e f
t
r i c u 1. iu rs 1 
c o m m o d 1 t i t ' s , 1 % G - 1 W 0 . 
1960-64 1965-69 1970*74 1975-SO 
Uice 21 15 7 1 
Coin (yellow) 46 3B 19 32 
(white) 22 20 5 , 4 
Copra 0 0 -12 -21 
Coconut oil 0 0 -4 -4 
ivoc.icated coconut 0 o -4 -4 
riu;,or 32 36 -15 
Cot ton */ a/ -7 
other crops 0 "o 0 0 
Pork 54 50 18 -3 
Chicken 97 122 55 57 
i *;;
r
, u 6 0 45 If? 15 
I'lshin ; 0 0 0 0 
W : : 0 0 -6 -29 
!iinbc. 0 0 -4 
Plyv.v anri veneer 0 0 -4 V * H 
There was very ittclc domestic production during this period; 
also, no available pri-e of row cotton. 
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rates for from zero for exportB such as 
ccntK'.. and gan^-.t.? to mi m a n 200
 ;
iprcent for toilet /md 
cosmetic preparations. 
Second, export commodities as expected receive lees protection 
than impart competing products. What is perhaps not veil recognized 
is the extent by which exports especially sugar, coconut, and logs 
have oeen penalized by price intervention policies. Cotton, an 
• , 7 / 
import substitute is also conferred a negative nominal protection.-
*3nftlly
;
 p-ice protection has declined over lime and indeed 
for export eoncnodi t irs have in effect been negative in the 19/iVe. 
This trend has i t been .solely due to changes, in government policy. 
In ri . prod'ict ivi tv gains since the late sixties have transformed 
. • lippir.es 'Vom being a net importer to a net exporter of rice 
by the jic-eond lv.;.f of the i970's. Government investment<? in irri-
gation and extension services to disseminate the new fertilizer -
respo.isive rice varieties developed in the into national, and national 
research eer*tr-rs> were instrumental in the lowering of domestic price 
•I . • 
n>ot:};h cctton is still a relatively minor crop, 3t provides 
a clear example of the government's tendency to discriminate again*? 
agriculture in •. «»vor of processing. Trice pretention to cotlon lint
i 
the tradeable cc^modiry, actually positive but is only 
received bv Phi.'.ppine Cotton Corporation, the government agency 
which has a monopoly of cotton lint processing. The f a ™ sector 
even .'ontribi tes additional ly to this protection by r e v i v i n g a 
price lower !har the border price of raw cotton. The domestic* 
pricc is contro' - ed by the ,government. ~ 
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relative to the world without reducing profitability of rice at 
3/ 
the farm level.—' The government's failure or unwillingness to 
export enough has actually permitted the domestic price to fall 
below world prices in recent years. 
The high protection of sugar before 1973 was not due to 
domestic economic policies but by the US policy of protecting 
their sugar industry. Nominal protection rate turned negative 
(-23S) after the end of our preferential access to the I'S sugar 
market in 197J. The excess of the expert to producer price of 
sugar was used to finance consumer subsidies which was felt 
necessary especially when world prices of sugar peaked in 1974 
and l«P.O. 
riffs, the main source of protection, for livestock 
products hove not significantly changed up to 1960. Tarifiy 
for c-ggs and chicken are 100 percent and 70 percent, respectively 
Tariffs for meat of other animals changed only froa 15 to 10 per-
cent. The apparent decline in nominal protection rates based on 
price comparison indicates the growing efficiency of these enter-
prises;. The shift to commercial type of production and the verri 
~ This process was somewhat delayed by a series of did^ase 
problems, droughts in 1972-1974, and the oil cirses which sign-
ificantly raised the fertilizer-rice price ratio but the Masagana 
99 Credit Program facilitated the rapid recovery with the rice 
sector from these setback. 
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integration o. . feedmi 11 ir.g and livestock production (e.g., contract 
farming in br iier production) generated economies of scale and 
facilitated international technology transfer (Cabonilla). These 
lowered unit cost of production and hence domestic price turning 
a significant part of the tariff protection redundant. 
The implicit taxatiun of many exportable commodities was o 
consequence of the choice of policy instruments to raise govern-
ment revenues, subsidize domcHtic -consumers, protect agro processing 
and,conserve natural resources--government objectives which became 
relatively important in the 1970's, The floating of exchange rates 
and the commodity boom which caused the dramatic improvement in 
tlv >gr i cultural terms of trade up to'the mid 1470Va (Fig. 2, p. 362) 
cri'itcd both a felt need to reduce food and raw material prices 
in the domestic market arid an opportunity for generating revenues 
from agricultural exports via export and other quasi-taxes. The 
coconut levy for example, was ostensibly to develop the coconut 
industry. These taxes, however, have not been withdrawn ns soon 
as world prices dropped. 
Implicit Tariffs on Agricultural Inputs 
Because low food and raw material prices tend to dominate 
agricultural product price policy, government interventions in 
the agricultural input markets may try to offset this. The 
inpur structure in a g r i m l t u r e is still relatively simple with 
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many of the inputs common across agricultural consaodities. 
Table 6 indicate, that except for the substantive subsidy in 
the use of gravity irrigation applicable only to about 44 percent 
of rice area, government policies tend to raise moderately 
domestic above border prices of agricultural inputs. Based on 
the official irrigation fee, the rate of subsidy is close to 
60 percent. In practice, it reaches almost 90 percent due to 
the low collection rate. Implicit tariffs on pumps for irrigation 
and hand tractors are higher than those for larger scale machine-
ries which are clearly more labor displacing to encourage their 
9/ 
domestic production.— 
The weighted average of Implicit tariff on mixed feeds based 
on legal tariff and tax rates was about 33 percent in 1974 (Medalla 
and Power 1979). Since there is hardly any imports of raised feeds 
and there are many non-tariff barriers cc mixed feeds and ingre-
dients, weighted average implicit tariff of feed Ingredients was 
estimated and these vary from 7 to 23 percent depending on the 
type of feed m i x . 
Despite price controls, tax free importations, and direct 
subsidies to fertilizer companies, the average taplieit tariff 
between 1973 to 1981 when the fertilizer industry was almost 
completely regulated was still 10 percent. This was varied 
— If the ixapact of subsidized interest rate and overvaluation 
o f d o m e s t i c -currency are included, there actually has been a net 
subsidy to user's cost of these capital equipment and therefore a 
tendency for government policy to promote farm mechanization. 
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Table 6. Implicit Tariff (IT) on Agricultural Inputs (%). 
Inputs IT 
Irrigation (NIA gravity)— -86 
(NIA communal) -92 
Irrigation p u m p s ^ 30 
Hand t r a c t o r s ^ 33 
b/ 
Four-wheeled tractors— 10 
c / 
Animal feeds (hog grower mash)-
11
' 7 
(cattle feeds) 17 
(layer mash) 20 
(broiler mash) 23 
Agricultural c h e m i c a l s ^ 23 
e/ 
Fertilizer^-' 1.0 
— Includes subsidy due to low irrigation fee and lov 
repayment rate. 
Based on tariff rate. 
c/ 
~ Based on weighted average implicit tariff on feed 
ingredients. 
d / 
— Based on tariff rate, 
e/ 
— Based on price comparison of urea, ammonium sulphate* 
mixed fertilizer and phosphates from 1973-1980. 
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through time, being somewhat lower in 1980-1981, and has also 
varied acro.vs different types of fertilizer, frequently higher 
for those used mainly in plantation crops such as sugar, bananas, 
and pineapples. It appears, therefore, that the protection of 
domestic manufacturing of these agricultural inputs,'which is 
actually significantly higher for fertilizer because of direct 
subsidies, has been an important consideration of policy. 
Effective Protection Rate in Agriculture 
Relative to Manufacturing 
The direction and rate of resource flows between agriculture 
ard non-agriculture is influenced not only by the effective rate 
o: protection in agriculture but also by the nature of incentives 
in the non-afcricultural sectors. The overall price effect of govern 
went policy as indicated by the effective protection rates seems to 
have creatcd an incentive structure that is significantly biased 
against agriculture (Table 7 ). This is consistent with the con-
_ ... . > J37I 
elusions of cwo earlier Philippine studies (Power,^and Bautista 
and Power, 1979). While value added in manufacturing has been 
artificially raised by 44 percent, price intervention has been 
artificially raised by 44 percent, price intervention policies 
hi.ve undervalued agricultural production during the last decade 
both through lower product pricc^p and higher input prices. Tradi-
tional and even new agricultural exports have been heavily penal-
ized*by "negative prote-.tion KPR for chicken, while expected to 
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Table 7. Effective protection rates cf major agricultural products 
and average EPR for manufacturing. 
Sectors Reference Year EFR 
Agriculture 
Rice 1979 _
0
. 4 
Rainfed 1979 -4.7 
Irrigated 1579 3.6 
Corn 
Copra (with export tax, CCSF 
levy) 1973-79 -24 
• (with export tax, 
CCSF levy
T
 UNICOM) 1980-61 -29 
Coconut oil 1973-79 -2.0 
• 1980-81 42.0 
Dessicated coconut 1373-79 -4.3 
1980-81 18.4 
Sugar 1974-80 -23 (NFR) 
Cotton 1975-81 -12 
Swine (commercial) -29 to 17 
Cattle (commercial) -16 to 7 
Chicken (conEiiercial) I55 to 278 
Eggs (commercial) - 9 to 19 
I*>gs 1979-80 -46 (NPR) 
1974 -10 
Lumber 1974
 1 6 
Plywood and veneer 1974 5 
Manufacturing 1974 44 
+AMJL ou &FR f 'f&u. w-AyiL 
overstated because tins pertains to broiler 
end of production (excluding the production of chicks) with 
a very small value a d d e d . ^ ^ Rice is essentially not 
protected. Farms covered by national gravity irrigations 
are compensated for the policy induced higher price they pay 
for their manufactured inputs. Rainfed farms, however, 
comprising 54 percent of rice area continue to have a small 
negative protection. 
Lumber, plywood and veneer, dessicated coconut received 
a modest El'R and coconut oil a relatively high EPR. These 
positive protection, however,, comes from substantially depressing 
prices of the raw material inputs because Nl'R's for these 
products are negative on account uf the 4 percent export tax. 
The 'cost of protecting these agro-processing sectors therefore 
is shouldered by farmer:* directly by lower farm prices in contrast 
to most manufacturing industries enjoying tariff protection 
where domestic consumer!! typically bears this burden in terms 
of higher product price:;. This policy structure may be less harm-
ful to t i»t» forestry sector where the policy might be achieving 
partly the desired goal of forestry conservation. In the 
coconut industry, however, the negative long-run consequence 
-v / -^r iiufoeverC^P l.yfhv proportion of jtfiV comn»ec<£Ta!t\J 
plun.hu-t\oA iii ifhrougU coXtrnu^ groWinsjwhere, th^re is no^expilcit 
charge i"vr t h e x n t e r m e d iate ' i'nputs-cliicks. 
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o n proil: - t iw:i is p r o b - i l ^ y im;. i n t e n d e d a n d t h e n e g a t i v e i n c o m e 
• I i s i r ihc.t ion i m p a r t w ; i l hi- m m h n o r e i m p o r t a n t . 
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Impact of Kxc'n.inge Rate Policy 
Macroeconc.raic policies affecting exchange rates also need to 
be considered n assessing Use overall magnitude of bia3 against 
agriculture when uhe official exchange rate does not reflect its 
true social o^.ort jnity - .-.Ht or itii shadow exchange rate. Net 
effective irc.eetion rate measures the proportional difference be-
tween value added at domestic, prices and border prices valued at 
the shadow exchange rate instead of the official exchange rate. 
Although' the -Itange rate has been aLlowed to float since 1970, 
the. structure o,
r
 tarifta, indiiccL sales tax, export taxun, and 
other trade restrictions Iwivc reduced import demand more than export 
.supply, thereby undervaluing the eo;;t of foreign exchange or con-
versely overvaluing the domestic currency. For the mid-1970's, 
Medal la estimated that the sy.st.em of protection resulted in a 20 to 
.10 percent rate of peso overvaluation,, depending on the assumptions 
. • , 11/ 
relating to the alternative trade regime.— 
Foreign Exchange Rate aud Met 
i:f:e
v
.'ive Protection Rate 
ihe genera 1 Iv high level of protection received by manufacturing' 
more than offsets the disincentive effect of the peso over-
— The high figure assumes free trade and the low figure assumes 
an opiiraal trade regime. 
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v.i! nat ion, its average net effective protection being stilL 
positive at percent. In contract., the agricultural sector bad 
to bear most'ol the penalty imposed on exports and unprotected 
import substitutes, as average net effective protection rate is 
reduced to a substnr.t ia 1 1 v negat i ve rate. Tariff protection is 
redundant for exportables and export, promotion policies pursued 
in recent years have been more available t.o industry. 
Foreign Exchange Kate and Intersectoral Incentives 
By implicitly assuming that distortion}! tu the exchange, rote 
have a uniform effect: on agriculture and manufacturing,the analytical. 
' b 
approach above does not allo-v n<i to examine the. effects of exchange 
rate policy changes on intei se-.t oral incentives. Moreover, exchange 
rates distortions due to di:;e..]ui 1 ibriurn in balance of payments 
"which are additionally adverse to agriculture are not taken into 
account. The serious deficits in current account prior to the 1<J62 
and n ? 0 devaluations were defended mainly by drawing on international 
reserves. O.i the other hand,, the chronic and growing deficit which 
began in thu mid-i'J/O's has been financed by heavy foreign borrowing. 
l)ovaluations favor prirus of traded over non-traded goods und 
services. Agricultural commodities .being primarily tr-wleable arc 
expected to benefit relatively more than r.on-agriculture which in-
cludes a large component e.f mm-1radeabler, like services. Agri-
cultural Incentives are aiso likely to improve relative to manufac-
turing because some manufacturing activities with very high protect-
ion have been virtually isolated from the international market making 
thera effectively non-traded. Additional protection afforded by the 
higher cost of foreign exchange will be redundant for these industries 
The rise in average domestic prices of manufactured products will then 
be relatively less than of agricultural products which are either 
exportable or receive very little trade protection. In fact, manufac-
turing profits may generally be squeezed as prices of intermediate 
inputs typically characterized by low protection increase at a higher 
rate than product prices. Thus, devaluations correct distortions due 
% 
to disequilibrium in balance of payments as well as part of the inter-
sectoral distortions due to the protection system. 
Trends in domestic terms of trade between agriculture and non-
agriculture provide, an overall summary measure of what is happening 
over time to economic Incentives in agriculture vis a viB the other 
sectors in the economy. Movements in the agricultural terms of 
trade depicted in Figure 2 are influenced by domestic and inter-
national demand and supply factors as well as domestic economic 
pulicies. The secular decline in agricultural terms of trade pre-
« 
dieted by Kngel's Law need not be a logical necessity with 
s c a r c e l;«ut, in an o p e n e c o n o n v , or with countervailing govern* 
Fir.. 2, Trends in igri cult urn I terms «f trail.- in 
t he Tii i I I rp i ues 
meat interventions. Bath comraodity specific end macro policies 
directly change relative prices. "Other policy instruments may 
also have an important, albiec, indirect impact by shifting demand 
and supply functions. 
Even discounting for the very favorable agricultural terms 
of trade at the start of the 1950'e which still reflects the 
postwar adjustments and the effect of Korean War, « gradually 
worsening trend can be observed up to 1961. The dismantling of 
exchange controls leading to the 1962 devaluation reversed this ' 
trend. The full impact of this policy change was felt only when 
« 
the retention scheme for export receipts was lifted after 1965. Thin 
« . 
was again reinforced by the floating of the exchange rate in 1970 
and the commodity boom of 1973-75. 
The dramatic improvement of agricultural terms of trade-, 
between 1962 and 1975, at an average rate of 3 percent, has now 
been matched by a sharply deteriorating trend since 1975, Two oil 
price shocks and the subsequent prolonged recession in many of 
Che Philippine trading partners severely dampened demand 
lor the country's major agricultural export products. The drop 
in relative or real price of agricultural products in the late 
1970s was most pronounced for rice. The gains in productivity 
from the new Beed-fertilizer technology and irrigation development 
produced record export surpluses which the government was not ai>le 
to competely sell on to the world market. The growing peso over-
valuation in the second half of the 1970's may also be partly 
3S 
responsible for the unfavorable price trends for agriculture. 
The impact of commodity specific policies and exchange rate 
policies on changes in terms of trade may be quantified economet-
rically. Domestic agricultural terms of trade depends on the 
international terms of trade, domestic economic policies represented 
by the official foreign exchange rate, and the nominal prot(ecti*n rate 
in agriculture relative to non-agriculture,and technical change in 
agriculture relative to non-agriculture. 
Preliminary results of our analysis based^on data from 19.50 to 
1980 reveal the crucial role of foreign exchange policy in determining 
agricultural incentives 
(1) T
d
 « 98.8 - 0.076 T
1
 ' R
2
 - 0.012 
(-0.60) 
(2) T
d
 = 43.7 + G.223T
3
" + 5.11 PX, R
2
 - 0.681 
(2.71) (7.65) 
£ * 
'International terms of trade (T ) bv itself is not correlated to 
d 2 
domestic terms of trade (T ); R is almost zero and the t-value 
1£./ -
in parenthesis is not significant (equatian 1}.— WieH fceth'-ths inter-
national terms of trade and the official exchange rate are specified more 
than two-thirds of the variation in domestic terms of trade is 
explained. International terms of. trade becomes significant but 
The definition of non-agricultural sector was limited to 
manufacturing because only the index of international prices for 
manufacturing is available. While equation (2) is not yet completely 
specified, the subsequent inclusion of the other relevant independent 
variables is not expected to substantially change this conclusion. 
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toe foreign exchange rate appear to be a more important 
explanatory variable. Failure, therefore, to maintain an equil-
ibrium exchange rate strongly discriminate against agriculture. 
Devaluations, by correcting a raajcr source of distortion in the 
macro price of foreign exchange, have significantly reduce this 
discrimination. It should be stressed, however, that devaluations 
have only belatedly corrected this discrimination. 
AO 
Chapter 4 
FINANCIAL POLICIES 
Credit has been a major instrument of agricultural development 
in the Philippines. In the early 1950s, the Sural Bank Law was 
passed to promote rural private backs and the Agricultural Credit 
and Cooperative Farmers
1
 Association (ACCFA) was also established 
to promote cooperative financial institutions catering especially 
to the rural sector. There are currently mora than a thousand 
rural banks operating in about 60 percent of municipalities. 
They have become the principal distributors of government spon-
sored supervised credit. The ACCFA was supposed to develop farm 
cooperatives providing production and marketing credit, but because 
of serious default problems, it . vas reorganised and renamed 
the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) to administer STaall 
supervised credit programs mainly for land reform beneficiaries. 
In early 1982, it was subsumed in the Land Bank of the 
Philippines which is supposed to be the primary source of financing 
reform program. 
The government's objective of increasing the credit flow to 
agriculture has been hampered by low interest rates policies. 
Up until the 1981 interest rate reform, interest rates and 
other financial charges were regulated by the Monetary 
Board to conform with the 16 percent ceiling stipulated by the 
Usury Law of 1916. During the past decade, allowable interest 
rates of formal agricultural credit ranged from 12 to 16 percent 
and additional loan charges from 2 to 3 percent depending on the 
security and other terms of the loans. Supervised credit bears 
a lcwer interest rate of 10 percent with additional charges not 
exceeding 3 percent. For savings deposits, the interest rates 
were about 6 percent. 
Since the late 1960s, official interest rates on agricultural 
credit have been lower than the scarcity value of loanable funds 
with negative consequence on the rate cf savings, investments in 
agriculture, and factor intensities.. Because of rapid 
inflation of around 20 percent during the 1970s, interest rates 
were negative in real terras. Xhi3 price structure rewarded 
borrowers and penalized savers. Ihi3 3lso created excess loan 
demand that limited the flow of loans to agriculture, especially 
to sieall farmers, where costs of transactions and risks for lenders 
are inherently higher. 
To increase agricultural credit, tha government required a 
certain proportion of lenders' portfolio of loans go to credit 
for agriculture and initiated a number of supervised agricultural 
credit programs. In 1974, the Monetary Board directed all lending 
institutions to allocate 25 percent of their loanable funds to 
agriculture and at least 10 percent of the total to agrarian 
reform beneficiaries. Private commercial banks, however, have 
strongly resisted this rule and have siiaply purchased certificates 
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of indebtedness arid other goveniEenC securities issued by the 
Central Bank to comply with the regulation because of the high 
cost of directly lending to farmers
4 
Table 8 lists the various special agricultural credit 
programs (SC?s) and their corresponding total loans granted 
during the period 1973-1980. Most of chess programs linked low 
interest, non-ccllateral loans with extension. Between 1S73 
and 1975, this was also tied to a fertilizer price subsidy. 
Financial institutions were provided preferential rediscount 
rates, loan guarantees, and assistance in loan administration 
within these programs. This was financed, in part, by foreign 
loans. 
Masagana 99 accounted for aliaost 30 percent cf total losns 
granted by SCPs. Since the immediate objective of Masagana 99 
was to recover froa serious crap .losses in 1373, priority was 
given to irrigated areas r/here the potential for rapid expansion 
of rice production in the short-run was greatest. Programs after 
Masagana 99, although much small, ar in scale, attempted to extend 
the supervised credit concept to non-rice, rainfed areas. 
Problems associated with these programs and policies are now well-
documented (David, 1979). Over the past, tvc decades, growth in 
agricultural leans came mainly from the Central Bank rediscount 
window rather than from additional equity capital or savings 
deposits. This is evidenced by the increase in the share of 
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Table S. Supervised agriculture! credit programs in the 
Philippines fror. IS73 to 15SO. 
'rcgre.r; Coinedity 
i i 
.c-aiis Granted^' \ 
(P ir,i 11 ior,} 
1. ttasagarm 39 Rice 
2. ilasaganang Mais an and 
Masagar.a 77 Corn 
3. Gulayan sa Kalusugan Vegetables 
4. Cpttcn Financing Progress Cotton 
5. Integrated Agricultural Fin?ncigr; for Virginia 
Tobacco-
7
 Tobacco 
5. Rica-Tobacco Supervised 
Credit Program Tobacco 
7. Philippine Tobacco Administration 
{PTA)Farm Crcdit Asst. Program Tobacco 
8. PTA Facility Loans Tobacco 
2. Bakahsng Birangay Cattle 
10. Biyayang Dagat Fish 
Total 
4,554 
521 
22 
71 
34 
3 
3 
1 
255 
35 
P5.53C 
_ r 
— As of December 31, 
b/ 
As of 1979. 
Source: Unpublished files. Technical Board of Agricultural 
Credit, Centra] Bank of the Philippines. 
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borrowings from the. Central Bank in total, resources of rural 
banks from 8 percent in 1961 to 5-4 percent in 1975. Low repay-
ment rat£3, which have plagued al^j'it all supervised credit prog-
rams, threatened the viability of rural credit institutions, 
and further damaged credit discipline s^iong borrowers. The 
impact of these programs on production at the farm level as well 
as at an aggregate level has regained unclear. While Masagana 99 
was instrumental in the rapid recovery of Philippine rice product-
ion from the global food grain crisis in 1973, the growth trend in 
rice production, and adoption of the new rice technology since the 
late, sixties ccnnot be solely attributed to this program (Herdt 
and Gsnzaiesi 1981). 
Despite thes^ government interventions, the real and relative 
levels of agricultural production loans (APL) granted have declined 
since the latsr ISGG's (Table 9). ALH grew in real terms but most 
of this growth tooK place in the lS60*s- The level of APL in 1979 
was still far below that of 1969. A?L as a percent of both net 
value added in agriculture and of total loans granted declined from 
22 percent and 20 percent in 1955—1969 to 19 percent and 11 per-
cent in the 1970's. 
These trends are peihaps surprising since technology 
and relative prices across sectors, commodities, and between 
inputs and outputs ara core important determinants of relative 
profitability and hence direction of resource allocation. Larson 
an^ Vogel and others.have already argued that the use of credit 
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Table 9. Selected indicators of trends in loans granted for 
agricultural production by bank and non-bank 
financial institutions, 1951-1979. 
Value of 
Year Agricultural Loans 
(P Million in 
1979 Prices) 
1951 376 
1955 534 
1960 2,757 
1961 3,536 
1962 4,022 
1963 4,461 
1964 4,503 
1965 4,420 
1966 4,582 
1967 5,556 
1968 5 ,565 
1969 r 7C 1 
1970 4,557 
1971 3,943 
1972 3,424 
1973 2,590 
1974 1,725 
1975 1,718 
1976 982 
1977 i ,096 
1978 2,534 
1979 3,378 
Agricultural Loans 
Agricultural 
Value Added 
as a Percent 
Total 
of*/ 
Loans 
Granted 
13 40 
17 24 
14 20 
19 22 
21 20 
24 20 
25 19 
23 19 
24 19 
27 20 
25 16 
22 16 
22 15 
21 13 
20 12 
19 10 
22 12 
21 09 
13 -
06 08 
13 -
19 -
—fFor later years, data on total loans granted have not been reported. 
Sources: Unpublished reports by the Technocal Board of 
Agricultural Credit, Central Bank of the Philippines, 
and the National Economic and Development Authority. 
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policies to compensate for the effects of policies that turn 
terms of trade against food and agricultural exports will have 
limited effects. It is toe often overlooked that pre-
ferential interest rates do not affect relative profitability 
and, because credit is fungible, additional liquidity supplied 
by credit w i l l b e allocated to the most profitable enterprise 
or to consumption, whichever provides the greatest utility. 
To compare the quantitative impact of credit policies to 
price policies, the effective subsidy rate (ESR) which expresses 
the amount of interest rate subsidy as a percent of net value 
added in agriculture at border prices has been estimated. Sub-
sidy is defined in terms of the difference in the cost of borrow^ 
ing between agricultural and non-agricultural loans multiplied 
by the value of agricultural loans granted. Another method is 
to estimate the amount of subsidy accruing to the sector due to 
the difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate of 
inflation. 
Differences in interest rates, between agricultural and non-
agricultural loans from formal financial institutions are small, 
at most, 2 percent. Moreover, interest represents only part of 
the costs of borrowing. Typically non-agricultural loans entail 
less transactions cost than agricultural loans for borrowers. 
Assuming that interest rate policy has meant a cost of 
borrowing differential of 6 percent in favor of agriculture, 
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the effective subsidy rate amounts to cniy 1 percent. Sven 
if the interest rate differential is increased two or three 
times in magnitude it is clear that the interest rate subsidy 
will not alter significantly the unfavorable incentive structure 
in agriculture vis-a-vis ncn-agriculture created by price policies 
On the other hand, the low interest rate policy seriously 
impairs the ability of rural financial markets to efficiently 
perform'the financial intermediation process. It does not 
provide incentives for mobilizing financial savings and induces 
an allocation of credit that is based on size of collateral and 
wealth rather than on productivity of credit use. 
The impact of the low interest rats policy has been generally 
regressive. The subsidy is shouldered by the lower-income popula-
tion, i.e., holders of currency bank deposits» and taxpayers 
through inflation, low interest rates on savings, and direct 
government outlay. Only about 10 percent of the total implicit 
interest rate subsidy is received by agriculture. Within agri-
culture, credit allocation is also not consistent with employment 
and equity objectives. Low-cost credit for agricultural machinery 
shifts the incentive system against use of labor without any sign-
ificant impact on yield. Less than 15 percent of the value of 
loans in the World Bank C r e d i t Mechanization Program in the 
Philippines was used for power tillers of small farmers. Four-
wheeled tractors and other larger farm equipment were purchased 
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with the bulk of the loans by sugar farmers with 50 hectares 
or more who constituted less than 10 percent of total number 
of farmers. 
In supervised credit programs, only farm operators are 
usually entitled to institutional credit despite the significant 
numbers of landless households in the rural areas. Rice has been 
the emphasis but rice farmers are actually better off than average 
farmers in c o m , coconuts, tobacco, and other crops, within the 
rice sector, priority was given to irrigated areas close to 
primary markets, i.e., relatively progressive locations ^/ith 
the greatest potential for rapid increases in production in the 
short-run. The procedure of setting loan limits on a per hectare 
basis means a higher credit ceiling for larger farms. Perhaps an 
even more important dimension of inequity in distribution of the 
implicit subsidies involved in these programs was reported by 
Esguerra in a recent analysis of Masagana 99. The study 
estimated that two-thirds of the implict subsidies have been 
received by participating financial institutions as incentives 
to lend to small farmers and only one-third by the farmer borrowers 
mainly from non-repayment of loans. Furthermore, the distribution 
of the subsidies accruing to farmer borrowers has been biased in 
favor of larger farmers. The subsidy to farmers can be increased 
through higjier default rates but this would simply transform super-
vised credit into a costly vehicle for effecting income transfers. 
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Chapter 5 
PUEIJIC EXPEHBIIUKE POLICIES . 
Thus far, our discussion has focused on policies effecting 
economic incentives. Aside frciE their impact on resource allo-
cation, prict and financial policies alsoaffect technological 
development and income distribution which are also major concerns 
of agricultural development. However, public expenditure policy 
has been a snore direct instrument of promoting technological 
change and iasproving income distribution in agriculture. 
In this section, the changes in the. level and distribution 
of public agricultural development expenditure by policy tools from 
1955 to 1980 are examined. The analysis attempts to infer prior-
ities pursued by the government from the allccaticr. of the budget 
over time rather than to quantify the economic effects of the 
different types of public expenditures such as research, exten-
sion and so forth. 
The basic source of data is the national budget published 
by the Ministry of the Budget. These have been compiled and class-
ified earlier by Capule, 
Public expenditure is 
the sum of current operating expenditures ana capital outlays. 
In this analysis, only national government expenditures which 
comprised about 80 percent of the total budget from 1955-1975 
and about 90 percent thereafter are covered because the expend-
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itures of local government cannot be broken down according to 
our classification of policy instruments, Furthermore, class-
ification of public expenditures by sector and by policy instru-
ments for agriculture was limited to economic development expend-
itures which formed about 15 percent in 1965 to 40 percent by 
1980 of the total budget. Even within economic development, it 
was not possible to divide the infrastructure budget sectorally* 
And likewise, there were measurement problems in allocating expend-
itures for the other government functions: general administration, 
defense, education, health, and other social services. 
Trends and Relative Siaa of Public 
Agriculture Expenditure 
The size of public allocation to agriculture provides a 
clear indication of government's commitment to that sector. 
In Table 10 the trends and relative importance of economic 
development expenditures on agriculture are presented. Public 
expenditures for agricultural development rose almost ten times 
between 1955 and 1980 or an average annual rate of 12 percent 
in real terms. This high growth rate is consistent with the 
general acceleration of total government outlay especially for 
economic development during the past decade. The increased 
en^phasis on infrastructure and non-agricultural development in 
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Table 10. Selected indicators of trends and relative importance of 
national public economic development expenditures on 
agriculture. 
Public expenditure Public economic development expenditure in 
in agriculture agriculture as percent of 
(fmillion, 1972 
prices) Net Value Public ecpnpmic Total 
added in development public 
Year agriculture expenditures expenditures 
1955 122 1.5. 15.0 5.3 
1956 176 2.1. 19.4 6,3 
1957 205 2.4 22.3 7.9 
1958 167 1.9 21.0 6.8 
1959 166 1.8. 19.8 6,6 
1960 179 1.9 18.2 6.3 
1961 182 l.S 1S.0 6.1 
1962 206 2.0 " IS.3 6.4 
1963 355 3.2 30.0 9.9 
1964 306 2.8 27.1 8.4 
1965 265 2.2 26.1 7.3 
1966 264 2.2 26.0 7.1 
1967 296 2.4 23.5 7.2 
1968 416 •3 a 27.6 8.8 
1969 435 3.2 25.8 8.3 
1970 361 2.6 23.5 7.1 
1971 452 • 3,1 26.7 8.5 
1972 567 3.8 20.7 8.9 
1973 767 4.9 - 18.0 9.0 
1974 1,061 6.8 20.4 1G.4 
1975 1,308 7.7 24.4 11.4 
1976 1,018 5.7 19.8 8.3 
1977 1,110 6.0 29.2 9.7 
1978 1,648 2.5 32.4 .12.5 
1979 1,394 6.6 26.2 10.1 
1980 1,242 5.6 17.7 9.0 
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the later period is apparent from the sharp rise in annual 
growth rate of the total economic development budget from 5 
percent to 19 percent before and after 1S7Q 
compared to agriculture which grew at 10 percent and 15 percent, 
respectively. 
Between 1955 and 1980 public expenditures in agriculture 
as percent of agricultural value added increased much faster 
than the share of total government expenditures to gross national 
product (from 2 percent to 7 percent in agriculture compared to 
10 percent to 14 percent for the total). It should be noted 
that this was not due to any dramatic sectoral shift in govern-
ment priorities with respect to expenditures policy but rather 
due to the decline in the share of value added in agriculture. 
The share of agriculture to total government expenditures 
increased only slightly over time. However, in terms of the 
public economic development expenditures, agriculture's share 
while varying from year to year remained at about 23 percent 
over the whole period with infrastructure receiving the greatest 
allocation (from 60 to 70 percent). 
Table II presents the trends in public expenditure in 
agriculture by policy tools while Table 12 shows the same 
changes in terms of the percentage composition, of expenditures. 
As noted in the footnotes, some limitations exist in the avail-
able, breakdown of data but these would not significantly affect 
T a b l e 1 1 . D i s t r i b u t i o n of d i r e c t i o n n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t a x p e n d i t u r 
i n s t r u m e n t s , 1 9 5 5 - l 9 8 0 -
/
 (f m i l l i o n , 1 
Pricing and Marketing 
Price 
b/ 
Suppprt— • 
Input 
Subsidies Subsidy 
C r e d l t
 Total—^ 
Irrigation Research and Extension 
e7 , Agran 
Reserach- Extension Total .
 R e f
1 
43 9 23 37 3 
86 10 33 43 5 
92 10 35 45 20 
L4 15 50 10 38 49 21 
28 29 20 12 43 60 10 
22 24 24 13 52 65 15 
14 16 27 15 55 70 14 
83 14 — 97 36 17 63 80 13 
143 12 — 155 32 17 70 07 19 
97 9 - 106 18 17 76 93 -
2y 
41 13 — 54 21 18 80 98 33 
24 10 - 34 25 17 77 94 29 
25 6 2 33 40 17 72 89 31 
24 3 10 37 35 21 73 94 
35 
27 2 12 28 39 22 >5 97 
38 
20 2 6' 25 120 19 66 85 38 
14 3 8 30 187 19 71 90 45 
13 4 13 68 171 24 104 128 67 
38 9 21 83 411 44 l
f
J3 242 107 
45 18 20 60 635 55 202 257 128 
38 22 — 46 382 56 175 231 135 
33 13 43 381 64 167 231 95 
39 4 — 35 864 77 170 247 103 
29 6 — 35 365 102 249 351 110 
30 5 _ 27 417 106 224 332 143 
21 6 - 92 261 353 130 
Si 12. Percentage distribution of direct n&tioiial KC i r i u a e n t expenditure on utfsicultu u by type oj 
-I 
Pricing and Marketing Irrigation Research and Extension Social Da 
Bricej. < Input 
Support- Subsidies Credit Total-
Subsidy 
Research^ Extension Total 
Agrarian 
Reform 
Com 
D 
1 
- - - 3 5 . 2 7 . 4 2 3 . 0 3 4 . 0 2 . 5 
- - - - 4 8 . 9 5 . 7 I B . 8 ' 2 4 . 5 2 . 8 
ah mm - - 4 4 . 9 4 . 9 1 7 . 1 . 2 2 . 0 9 . 8 
p 
i 
- 7 . 7 - 8 . 2 2 7 . 5 5 . 5 2 0 . 9 2 6 . 4 1 1 . 5 
- 1 6 . 9 - 1 7 . 5 1 2 . 0 7 . 2 2 8 . 9 3 6 . 1 6 . 0 0 - 1 2 . 3 - 1 3 . 4 1 3 . 4 7 . 3 2 9 . 0 3 6 . 3 8 . 4 I 
i 
- 7 . 7 - 8 . 8 1 4 . 8 8 . 2 3 0 . 2 3 8 . 4 7 . 7 
2 9 . 0 4 . 9 - 3 3 . 9 1 2 . 6 5 . 9 2 2 . 0 2 7 . 9 4 . 5 j 4 0 . 3 3 . 4 - 4 3 . 7 9 . 0 4 . 8 1 9 . 7 2 4 . 5 5 . 4 » 3 1 . 7 2 . 9 M 3 4 . 6 5 . 9 5 . 6 2 4 . 8 3 0 . 4 9 . 5 i 1 5 . 5 4 . 9 - 2 0 . 4 7 . 9 6 . 8 3 0 . 2 3 7 . 0 1 2 . 5 6 • 9 . 1 3 . 8 - 1 2 . 9 9 . 5 6 . 4 2 9 . 2 3 5 . 6 1 1 . 0 
I 8 . 4 , 2 . 0 0 . 7 1 1 . 1 1 3 . 5 5 . 7 2 4 . 3 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 5 1 5 . 8 0 . 7 2 . 4 8 . 9 8 . 4 5 . 0 1 7 . 5 2 2 . 5 8 . 4 2 ) 6 . 2 0 . 5 2 . 8 9 . 5 5 . 7 6 . 1 1 7 - 2 2 2 . 3 8 . 7 2 ) 5 . 5 - 0 . 6 1 . 7 7 . 8 1 0 . 8 5 . 3 1 8 . 3 2 3 . 6 1 0 . 5 2 I 3 . 1 0 . 7 1 . 8 5 . 6 ' 2 6 . 5 4 . 2 1 5 . 7 1 9 . 9 1 0 . 0 1 t 2 . 3 0 . 7 2 . 3 5 . 3 3 3 . 0 4 . 2 1 8 . 3 2 2 . 5 1 1 . 8 1 5 . 0 1 . 2 2 . 7 8 . 9 2 2 . 3 5 . 7 2 5 . 8 3 1 . 5 1 4 . 0 1 i 4 . 2 1 . 7 1 . 8 7 . 7 3 8 . 0 5 . 1 1 8 . 7 2 3 . 8 1 1 . 8 i 2 . 9 1 . 7 - 4 . 6 4 8 . 5 4 . 3 1 3 . 4 1 7 . 7 1 0 . 3 i 3 . 2 1 . 3 - 4 . 5 3 7 . 5 6 . 3 1 6 . 4 2 2 . 7 9 . 3 ) 3 . 5 0 . 4 - 3 . 9 3 4 . 3 6 . 9 1 5 . 3 2 2 . 2 9 . 3 1 
ft 
1 . 8 0 . 4 - ' 2 . 2 5 2 . 5 6 . 2 1 5 . 1 2 1 . 3 6 . 7 2 . 2 0 . 4 — 2 . 6 4 0 . 5 7 . 7 1 6 . 1 2 3 . 8 1 0 . 3 1 . 7 0 . 5 - 2 . 2 3 3 . 6 7 . 4 2 1 . 0 2 8 . 4 1 0 . 5 1 
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footnotes -.Tables n and 12. 
.-'Fro* V-l'j; 'jnd^r a now formats the national budget presents, 
support to government corporations under a separate chapter. This is 
included in our data for tfie.lC75-l
r
.OQ period. The 1J73 and 1 £30 
figures are estimates. 
-'it has not been possible to obtain the complete figures for ISSf 
1SS1 based OR the level of disaggregation of our data. It should be 
noted, however, that durir.Q this period the National Rice and Corn 
Corporation (ARIC) wss already engaged in pries stabilization activi-
ties, mainly in the form of rice procurement and distribution. Our 
working table shows expenditures for the administration of sugar and 
other quota products. These er& relatively small and have been omitted 
here although these are included in the totals, ^ote also that a raajor 
part of the total outlay for price support is accounted for by expendi-
tures of the Rice and Corn Administration, later the National Grains 
Authority (1963-1980). 
^ 4 
-As.explained in the text, the data under this policy refer only 
to expenditures related to the administration of the Agricultural 
Guarantee and Loan Fund (AGLF'
:
 and are available only for .1957-
1974. 
^ T h e 1S53-1962 totals include the omitted expenditures of the 
Sugar Quota Administration (see footnote b above]. 
-^Excludes research expenditures of state colleges and universitie 
-^A large part of expenditures on community development were 
allocated for the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges. 
Source: de Leon (10). 
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the general pattern indicated in the tables. . It is obvious that 
public expenditure policies "nave been aimed primarily at raising 
productivity through irrigation, extension, and research and 
improving income distribution through agrarian reform and rural 
community development. Budgets for environmental management and 
conservation may be viewed both as a tool for enhancing long-
run productivity in natural resources and the economy as a whole 
and improving income distribution between present and future 
generations. 
Trends in public expenditure for price and marketing policies 
reported here do not reflect government's changing priorities be-
cause these figures grossly understate the cost of operating the 
national agencies involved in the marketing of 
rice, c o m , sugar, fertilizer, and other agricultural commodities. 
A significant and increasing part of their expenditure originate 
from cheap loans from the Central Bank via government financial 
institutions but data for these are difficult to obtain. Interest 
rates are at a highly subsidized rate of 6 percent and account-
ability for non-repayment has not been strictly enforced. 
Extension received the highest allocation prior to the 
1970s (27 percent), even.higher than irrigation from 1959 to 
to ..1971. -Extension's share-has declined except during the 
peak of Mssagana 99 in 1973-1974 while expenditures for research 
have steadily, increased but the latter is still only about one-
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fourth of extension. Expenditures for social development may 
also have been as significant as extension in the early period 
because for the years with available data their share averaged 
22 percent. Agrarian reform activities consisted mainly of 
land resettlement projects in the pre-martial" law period and 
administration of land reform in rice and c o m after 1972. Rural 
community development programs included grants-in-aid, self-help 
projects and cooperatives development. 
Irrigation investment has been subject to short-run fluct-
uations; it va3 high in the late 195Cs and this picked up again 
in the 1970s. Hayami and Kikuchi found a strong correlation 
between shifts in investment and =ihort-run changes in the world 
price of rice. The increase of irrigation investment in the 1970s 
may also be related to othe.r factors. Studies at IRB.I in 1976 
indicate that irrigation investment has a higher social benefit-
cost ratio than price support and fertilizer subsidy except when 
a high discount rate is used for large-scale high cost projects 
( Hayami, et. al., 1977), 
Policy thrusts of international financial institutions such 
as the World Sank and Asian Development Bank which have financed 
a major part of rehabilitation and construction of new irrigation 
systems may have influenced the government's own choice of policy 
priorities. Changes in the sectoral distribution of official 
development loans reported in Table 13 indicate that this may 
Table 13. Distribution of official development loans by sectors, 
1954-1979 (percent). 
• L 
1952-1969 1570-1974 1975-1979 1370-1379 ; 
1. Agriculture 22. 22.5 33.1 31.1 
a. Agriculture^ 18.3 9.5 11,7 
b. Irrigation 5.8 17.5 14.6 
c. Integrated Area 
Development 1.0 5.1 4.1 
d. Rural Infrastructure - 1.0 .7 
2. Industry 29.0 18.0 .15.3 16,0 
3. Power and Energy 36.0 22.8 15.7 IS.2 
4. Transportation 11.0 22.2 1S.1 19.3 
5. Others^ 2.0 11.9 15.8 14.8 
—'No breakdown is available. 
-^Includes education, population and water supply loans. 
Source: National Economic and Development Authority. 
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be the case. The growth in the share of agriculture from 22 per-
cent to over 30 percent in the 1970s was due primarily to expan-
sion of irrigation investment. 
Agricultural Research 
With the growing land constraint, technological change 
through research and extension will increasingly be an important 
means of augmenting agricultural production. However, the pro-
ductivity of research and extension depends not only on their 
total budget but also in the way these budgets are utilized. 
The following discussion essentially summarizes previous analysis 
of Evenson on the nature and direction of research and extension 
in the Philippines. 
Although the agricultural research system in the Philippines 
is generally regarded as one of the more advanced in Asia, expend-
itures for both research and extension which amounted to only 0-45 
percent and 0.91 percent of value added of agricultural production, 
respectively, are low by international and even by Southeast Asian 
standards. As in other developing countries, extension programs 
have been emphasized to a much greater extent than research. More-
over, except for sugar, most of agricultural research and extension 
is supported by the public sector with some assistance from exter-
nal agencies. 
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Economic benefits from research will be highest in areas/ 
commodities where potential improvements in technology and size 
of market are great. In practice, allocation of research has 
been influenced by the supply of scientific manpower and other 
social objectives such as improving nutrition,levels and equi-
table geographic distribution of research expenditure. In terms 
of congruence between distribution of research and size of 
markets w h i c h i s presently the only quantifiable variable, 
Table 14 indicates that relatively more research investments 
have been directed to commodities of miner economic importance, 
neglecting some major commodities as shown by the ratio of re-
search spending to gross value of the commodity. The incon-
sistency between distribution of research budget and commodity 
value seems to have worsened between 1973 and 1S80; their corre-
lations decreased from 0.91 to 0.23. Thus the increase in real 
research investment over this period has not been accompanied 
by a closer matching of research spending with economic i ^ o r t -
ance. 
Sugar, pineapples, bananas, citrus, fruits, and coffee, 
which are all important export crops appear to have very little 
research budget. Cotton, l e g u m e s , tobacco, root crops, vegetables, 
and poultry which are of lesser economic importance receive 
relatively high research attention. A relatively low priority 
is .given to c o m , an important crop and the staple food and 
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. Table 14. >5easures of importance of agricultural research 
expenditures, b y earned!ties 
Qxnnorii tries 
as % of gross 
value b y ccrnno -
dity 
1 5 # 
GaaoodLty research 
share in total 
research spending 
ity share 
in gross , value 
of all ccmnodities 
1573775- i m 1973/7A' 155cr 
gs 
AM) ,448 .592 .621 
CoCCTJUt* .125 .072 .058 .084 .037 
Corn and Sorghun!* .132a/ .060 .039 .065 .065 
Fiber coops .040 .041 .007 
Fruit crops* .087" .040 .026 .070 .07? 
B^snana .004 
Pineapple 
Mango 
.003 . . . 
.070 
Citrus 
. Others 
.046 
.250 
Ifigsanesi* 1.29 .030 .051 .007 .oos 
Q p iniipnf^] horticulture .002 .014 
Plantation crops .006 . o n .042 
lubber : .130 
fjyan .206 
Coffee .00ft .037 
a c e 
.047 
.034 
.060 .047 
.137 .16? 
Wheat high 
loot crops 
Sugar cane 
.014 .072 .030 
.011 .058 . o n .050 .053 
Tobacco .594 .020 .034 .005 
Vegetables .430 .060 .044 .019 
Fisheries* .150 
Facestry* .190 
livestock* . .080 
Beef-carabeef .035 
Park ,070 
Poultry* .400 
Iairy 
Pasture 
Socio-ecflnanics 
Soil and water resources 
.080 
.132 
.170 
.060 
.04 
.04 
.039 
,050 
.067 
.158 .113 
.144 .111 
.067 ..177 
.021 .066 
.007 .052 
.005 .047 
.009 
.021 
.101 
.072-
.174 
.192 
.112 
.061 
* 1 h e correlation between shares in the research budget used In the value of 
a l l crrnrrtttiftfi w a s 0.91 in 1973/74 and 0,73 i n 1980. The nine caraodities 
correlated are identified b y 
* •» 
a/ F o r com, this figure is 0*95%. 
. b/ F o r abaca, this figtre is .163%. the relatively higher research expen-
'ditaire is & r cot ten.. 
••j,*,*—4 Anmm M w w t m e r and Bloan, 
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major source of income of the poorer farmers. Also, judging * 
from our very low yields compared to Thailand which has a 
similar resource endowment and has only recently become a major 
exporter of coin, there seems to b e a strong 
potential for expanding corn production in the Philippines. 
Research in coconut and forestry is comparatively small and 
funded mainly from taxes directly levied on their producers for 
this purpose in contrast to other commodities where the cost of 
research is shouldered by the taxpayer in general. 
In rice research which has primarily been conducted at the 
International Rice ?.esearch Institute (ISH.I) since 1962, the newly-
developed technology has been, generally regarded as more suitable 
to irrigated conditions. The fact that modern varieties have been 
adopted in 70 percent of rainfed areas, however, demonstrates the 
potential of technology development in rainfed areas. It has 
been estimated that if the cost of irrigation development is in-
cluded, increasing production through investment in rainfed rice 
may have a benefit-cost ratio greater than for irrigated rice. 
In recent years, IKRI has devoted more resources to develop rice 
varieties especially suited to rainfed areas. 
Agricultural Extension 
Although the commodity breakdown of extension expenditures 
is net.available, the emphasis of extension on rice is <<uite 
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evident. The Masagatia 95 Program caused the jump in extension 
expenditures in 1973-1974 as extension agents assumed the role 
of loan administrators. In Table 15, the regional b r e a k d o ^ 
of extension shows the ratio of extension expenditures to value 
added in agriculture to be higher in the major rice-producing 
regions or Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog especially when 
the budgets of the U.P. College of Agriculture and the govern-
ment agencies in Manila are allocated to these regions. The 
relatively intensive extension in Ilocos is consistent with 
the high research expenditures and numerous supervised credit 
programs in tobacco end cotton reported earlier. 
Most assessments of extension services in Che Philippines 
stress the problems of organization and quality of personnel. 
Evenson, on the other hand, raises a more fundamental issue as he 
tries to explain the much heavier investment in extension compared 
to research in Philippine agriculture. Part of the reason 
is clearly the cheaper cost of manpower for extension versus re-
search. But perhaps more important, there seems to be a general 
belief among policymakers that agricultural technology is highly 
transferable from regions with high research focus to regions 
with a high extension emphasis. It is not clear, however, 
whether suitable technology exists or is being produced by other 
nations. It should be stressed therefore that the value of 
extension depends essentially on availability of appropriate 
technology. 
Table 15. Public expenditures for agricultural extension by region, 1379. 
Region 
Agricultural 
Extension 
(P million) 
Value Added 
in Agriculture 
(P million) 
1 
Extension 
Expenditures 
Relative to 
Agricultural 
Value Added 
(percent) 
Ilocos 9.S 2,S87 0.33 
Cagayan Valley 5.5 3,069 0.18 
Central Luzon 13.2 • 4,246 0.31 
Southern Tacalog 17.6 8,539 0.20 
Bicol 4.4 3,725 0,12 
Western Visayas 9.9 6,238 0.16 
Eastern and Western 
Visayas 5.5 5,153 0.11 
Central and Northern 
Mindanao 6,5 7,278 0.09 
South & Western 
;n ndanao 9.9 , 11,978 0.08 
UPCA 
Manila 27.5 - -
:P 
- D u e to data constraints, the figures for agricultural extension are 
based on 1975 proportions by region. 
Sources: Evenson, Waggoner, and Bloom and NEDA. 
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Recent analyses or supervised .credit programs and the nature 
of inefficiencies on rice farms lead us to question conventional 
approaches of currant extension programs. First, technical 
inefficiencies tend to be more important than allccative ineffi-
12_/ 
ciencies in explaing lew productivity of rice farms (Mandac, 1S7S). 
This is consistent with empirical studies which overwhelmingly 
show that farmers in less-developed countries maximize expected prof its 
(Schulta, 1564), Thus an effective extension program should focus 
on teaching principles of new farm technology or farm practice 
rather than enphasize the application of recommended input 
levels. Extension workers cannot be expected to make better 
decisions than farmers given the great heterogeneity of physical 
and market conditions across farms. Mare often than not, uniform 
levels of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals are simply rscos*-
mended over a wide geographic area without due consideration to 
individual farmers' resource conditions. 
Second, the common belief that extension would be more effect-
ive if tried with low-cost credit ana vice versa is not clearly 
borne out by empirical evidence. In the ease of rice, the modern 
varieties introduced in'1967 have already been rapidly adopted in 
13 ' 
— ' T e c h n i c a l inefficiency refers to the inability of farmers 
to achieve potential maximum output for every level of input. 
Allocative inefficiency refers to the inability of farmers tc 
use the, optimum level of inputs given their resources and level 
of knowledge. 
A f ©o 
67 percent of irrigated areas and in 45 percent of rainfed areas 
4 , 
prior to the Masagana 99 Program. The fact that the rate of 
adoption has increased to 85 percent and 71 percent, respectively, 
in 1979 cannot be attributed to the Masagana 99 Program but rather 
should be viewed as a continuation of the long-run adoption proces 
of the new technology. 
In the case_ of c o m , there has been little, dissemination of 
new varieties developed in the early 1970s despite the Maisan 77 
and Masaganang Maisan programs because the new technology apparent 
did not offer higher profitability for the farmer. Extension and 
development o£ financial markets are indeed important components 
of rural development but the strategy of linking the two should 
guard against dissipating the efforts of scarce competent tech-
nicians in loan administration because this has not significantly 
raised repayment rates in supervised credit programs. 
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Chapter 6 
DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST AND 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Economic policies particularly those which distort relative 
prices have been shown to have generally discriminated against ' 
agriculture. An extremely important question to a3k,therefore^ 
is whether or not this policy structure leads to a roorE (less) 
efficient resource allocation thereby increasing (decreasing) 
national output. Do government policies encourage resources to 
shift toward more socially profitable economic activities? An 
attempt is made to answer this question by evaluating if the 
Philippines has a comparative advantage in various agricultural 
activities based on estimates of domestic resource cost of foreign 
exchange. Domestic resource cost (DRC) represents the social cost
 7 
of converting Philippine resources into foreign exchange through 
production for export and import substitution. A DRC lower than 
the shadow exchange rate (SER) indicates comparative advantage, 
since the SER represents the social value of foreign exchange. 
Moreover, selecting activities with lower D3.Cs means reducing the 
social cost of balancing the foreign exchange budget. 
Industries characterized by high effective protection rates 
are likely to have high excess profits or a high level of ineffi-
ciency or both. Bautista and Power
1
s analysis of the manufacturing 
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sector indicates that DfiC's are higher for industries with higher 
E?R'3 and lower for exports which frequently have negative protect-
 7 
ion. "Competition in export markets forces firms to be cost cons-
cious, while the highly protected domestic market induces complacency 
in domestic resource use among inward-oriented industries." 
The fact that agriculture survives and indeed grows despite 
negative protection indicates an inherent comparative advantage that
 y 
is generally confirmed by our estimates of DUC's (Table 16 ). DR.Cs 
13/ 
are generally below the shadow exchange rate of ?8.B8.— The only 
exception is broiler production. Cabanilla, however, has argued that there 
will likely be a favorable change in comparative advantage in the 
near future given the poultry sector's historical record of product-
ivity growth as a result of effective international transfer of new 
production technology, local management efficiency, ana the nation's 
impending breakthrough in corn production. Poultry may represent 
a successful case of an infant industry where initial growth was 
induced by high levels of protection. 
Cultivated land per worker has started to decline in the 196Q's 
and thus expansion of agricultural production means increasing 
competition for land use (David and Barker,1979 ). For evaluating 
13' 
— Based on the assumption that the degree of peso overvaluation 
is 20 percent, a rather conservative assumption given the growing 
deficit in balance of payments financed by heavy foreign borrowing 
since the mid-lSyQ's. 
Table 16. Domestic resource eosi: of aslactad agricultural products 
REFERENCE YEAR DEC 
Rice 
C o m 
Ccpra 
Sugar 
Cotton 
t 
S v i n e ^ 
Cattle 
Chick, 
EfcSa 
• Logs 
Lumber 
Plywood « Veneer 
1979 
1979 s, 1980 
1576 
n I,el. 
1975-IS81 
1973, 1980 
1973, 1980 
1978/ 1380 
1973, 1980 
197A, 1977-1979 
1974, 1977-1979 
1974, 1977-1979 
6,3-6. 
8-9 
5.9-6.2 
hi 
n.a.— 
1.22 
6-8 
S-8 
11-2-0 
7-3 
3.4-5.5 
6.2-6.9 
4.7-6.0 
a/ 
— T h e range represents differences across technology, location, 
time, and/oT source of data. 
—^Not yet available. 
—^Estimates for livestock and poultry are based cm ceomercial 
type of production. 
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comparative advantage across agricultural commodities, land might 
be a more relevant limiting factor to consider than foreign exchange. 
It might seem useful, therefore, to examine closely not only the 
ranking of DRC's between agriculture and non-agriculture but with-
in agriculture, across the different cossnodities. 
Although the latter is of course an interesting and important 
issue, it may not be possible to provide conclusive interpretations. 
Difference in DRC's across agricultural commodities is much, narrower 
than between agriculture and non-agriculture and given the usual 
measurement error involved in the empirical estimation of DRC's, 
it would be more prudent to interpret .the patterns we find as indi-
cative rather than as basis for recommending which crop to promote. 
In any case, one basic assumption w e wish to stress is that the ^ 
private sector will generally make optiaal allocation decisions 
if the government permits price signals that conforms to real 
resource scarcities. 
The most important conclusion from these estimates of DRC's 
is that almost without exception the major agricultural activities 
demonstrate comparative advantage. Given the good overall perform-
ance of agriculture in the 1970*s in the face of what we have 
found to be adverse government policies, this result is not 
surprising. 
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Chapter 7 
PRICE INTERVENTION POLICIES AHD LNTER-
SECTORAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
la the introduction, it was hypothesized that the secular 
decline in the share of the agricultural sector in the Philippine 
economy has been accelerated by domestic economic policies which 
discriminated against agriculture. In this chapter, the role of 
price intervention policies in affecting this process of structural 
change is examined by measuring their impact or. intersectoral capi-
tal flows. The implications of these policies on income distribution 
is also analyzed first by comparing the rate of t a c t i o n between agri-
culture and non-agriculture, taking into account the implicit taxes 
from these price intervention policies and second by relating the rate 
of intersectoral capital flows of capital to that of labor. 
There are two types of capital that, is extracted or tranferred 
from agriculture to industry as development proceeds. The first 
comes from the intersectoral movement of financial resources. In 
real terms, these are, of course, in the form of the excess of the 
goods agriculture sells at home and abroad over the goods it purchases 
from domestic non-agriculture and the world. The second is the 
intersectoral movement of human capital, i.e., labor resources in 
the rural sector migrating to the urban areas to seek more productive 
employment. The cost of rearing and training this labor supply is 
a form of capital investment borne by the agricultural sector. As 
a residual employer, the agricultural sector also bears the cost of 
supporting surplus labor in the rural areas until they can be 
productively employed in the non-agricultural sector Cfotopoulos 
and Nugent, 3.976) . There is, then, a benefit to agriculture from 
the transfer of this labor. 
Trends in Hat Capital Flews 
This analysis focuses on the net capital flow in real 
terms. This ran be expressed in both physical Cleft hand side) and 
financial (right hand side) terms and can be divided into private 
and government net capital flews. 
OF - IF - C;, = CS
a
 - I
a
) + d
a
 ~
 G
a ) 
Outflows CPF) consist of the amount of total goods agriculture 
sells to non-agriculture and to the world; inflows (IF), the amount 
of intermediate and consumer goods, agriculture purchases from non-
agriculture and the world. The difference between OF and IF is 
equivalent in financial teuTas to savings (S
a
) minus investment (la) 
in agriculture plus tax revenues from agriculture (T
a
). The term 
(S
a
 - I
a
) may be interpreted as net private lending, i.e., the 
amount of private investible funds from the agricultural sector 
available for capital formation in the rest of the economy. The 
government through its sectoral source of revenues (T
a
) aad allo-
cation of expenditures (G
a
) also accounts for part of the net 
capita^ flows. 
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The direction -end rat:a of iatersectcrsJ. capital flows is ^ * 
deterrtined by both market forcca siid government policies via 
their inpacts on relative profitability. Sat private capital 
flows rs^pcad essentially to the sectoral pattern of private 
profitability. There is also soma evidence that even public 
investments are affected by profitability considerations 
(Esyami and Kikuchi, 1975)« 
In Fig. 3, , Taaurj's tima aeries estimates of net private 
capital outflow from agriculture from 1950-1955 are depicted 
together with de Lecn's estimates based on data frem the input-out-
14/ 
put table for 5 years bttsreen 1561-1978.— Despite the differ-
ence in mvVcl.od3 ss.C a.ita sourcas> the two sets of estimates 
for the overlapping years (1961-1965). are rs^iarkaoly close. 
As expected, tra-e 'ass been a substantial net private capital 
outflow from Egriznlt ire throughout the whole period (Table 16 ). 
This has risen i-
1
50-1365, averaging about 21 percent of agri-
cultural gross value aJdc-d. Between the nid-1360's and mid-1970's, 
net private capital ci.tflovs w^re severally lower, and a3 a propor-
tion of agricultural vrjue srd^d only half those or earlier years. 
— Net private cap i. -al flew is ssasured empirically as OF-EF 
which is equal to S
a
 - T
&
 + T
a
. T
a
_was" not subtracted because 
tine 3eries data are net available. An altesspt was however, made to 
estimate in a rough i»s; • T
a
 aT
*«i The general magnitude are 
discusaed>in the next a jet ion * ~ . . ' . . - ' 
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I 
Paauw data 
60 
i 
S5 
Input-output data 
70 75 
SO 
„.
l t
^iows from Philippine 
Trends in net p x i ^ t a capxt|l outflows 
agriculture, b i l l o n • « ' 
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Table 16 . Trends in net private capital outflows from agricul-
ture and agricultural value added, million pesos, 
1972 prices. 
Agricultural 
GYA 
ai 
tfet Capital 
Outflows 
U ) 
C2) 
(1) 
1/ Paauw— 
1950 5,338 1,290 .22 
1951-1955 7,213 1,560 .22 
1956-1960 9,410 1,974 .21 
1961-1965 11,121 2,373 .21 
J T JJ de Leon— 
1961 10,643 2,454 .23 
1965 11,891 2,669 .22 
1969 14,412 1,772 .12 
1974 17,465 2,232 .13 
1978 21,502 4,590 .21 
— Estimates from Paauw, D . S., "The Philippines: Estimates 
of Flows in the Open, Dualistic Economy Framework," G . P . School 
of Economics, 1968. 
—^Estimates from de Leon, K . S. J . , Intersectoral Capital 
Flows and Price Intervention Policies in Philippine Agriculture, 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of the Philippines 
at Los Banos, November 1982. 
Agricultural terms of trade improved significantly during this 
period (Fig.2). As agricultural terns of trade dropped after 
1975, net private capital outflow in 1973 rose to twice the 
levels in the 1 9 6 0 a n d was again about 21 percent of agricul-
tural value added. This inverse relation between net private
 / 
capital outflow and agricultural terns of trade is a clear in-
dication or the latter's iatpcrtdrice in affecting intersectoral 
incentive structure. 
Price Intervention Policies and Net Private 
Capital Flows 
There are three ways by which capital can be transferred 
from agriculture to non~agriculture* Tvo have been noted already, 
namely, net private lending (S
a
 - I
a
) and net government revenues 
<T
a
 - G
a
) . Taking these two as-given* a third way is through price 
intervention policies. These can require agriculture to trade nors 
in real goods and services for less in return by distorting the 
terass of trade. Customs duties, fc-r trample, make manufactured 
goods more expensive to buy, whether dosastically or internationally 
while export taxes reduce the net price agriculture receives for / 
its sales both at hcaie and abroad. 
With respect to trade with the world, thesa penalties show 
up explicitly in tsx revenue (export taxes and custom duties). In 
contrast, they are iisplict taxes involving transfers through 
market p'rice distortions in the case of domestic trade. If the 
76 
price intervention policies were eliminated, the implicit taxes / 
would disappear. We assume however, that the government would 
impose 3ome other taxation measures on agriculture to make up 
for the loss in revenue from explicit taxes. The correspondence 
might not b e exact, but this seems to be preferable to assuming 
that T
a
 would decline. 
Our main interest then, is in measuring the proportion of 
total net private capital outflows that could be attributed to 
price intervention policies. To do this, we take net private 
lending and nee government revenues as given and ask simply what 
is the difference in real resources that would b e required to 
accomplish this financial transfer under, distorted and undistorted 
prices. The difference, then, would represent the implicit tax ' 
in real terms. 
It is not likely, of course, that the financial transfer 
would be exactly the same under the two sets of prices. Absence 
of prxce intervention policies might mean more investment in 
agriculture. It might also mean more saving, however, as agricul-
ture's real income improved. Likewise, it is difficult to predict 
the direction of change of T
a
 - G
a
. In any case our assumption of 
a constant financial transfer enables us to gauge the general 
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magnitude and importance of the effects of price intervention 
policies 
Table 17 shows the results of this exercise, it is evident that 
Wist of the implicit tax is attributed to protection of the goods 
agriculture b u y s . This is partly due to the fact that only 
domestic trade enters into the calculations so that the effect 
of export tases cn agriculture's sales is not present. The other 
important factor is the high average protection of manufactured 
consular goods. 
The implicit tax in 1974 turns out to be considerably greater 
than the estimated explicit taxes agriculture pays (J 1,275 million) 
based on Macaraaas estimate of the tax revenue contributed by 
jp ^  
~'To do this we take each component of the net private capital 
flow and decompose it into a corresponding real flow at undistorted 
prices and a measure of the implicit tax. Let x represent one of 
these components and ? and p , be distorted and undistcrted prices, 
respectively. Then 
* = « £ - | ( l + ) p p p p p 
This can also be written as 
? P •-
This is more convenient because the'second term in parentheses 
corresponds to a nominal rate of protection, or implicit tariff. 
The implicit taxes from each component, then are aggregatea to get 
the total. It is evident that some represent negative protection 
on agriculture's sales, while others represent positive protection 
on agriculture's purchases * 
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Table 17. Estimates of net private capital flow from domestic 
trade base'd on undistorted prices and levels of 
implicit tax due to price intervention policies. 
(in million of pesos at 1972 prices) 
FLOW 
Total Outflows 
UHDISTORIED 
CAPITAL FLOWS 
13,135 
IMPLICIT 
TAX 
61 (1.7)~ 
Agric'l sales of con-
sumer & intermediate 
goods to non-agricul-
ture 13,135 
Agric'l exports of con-
sumer & intermediate 
goods 
Total Inflows 15,279 f,453 (SB.3) 
Agric'l purchases from 
non-agriculture of: 
consumer goods 
intermediate goods 
investment goods 
13,146 
2 , OSS 
46 
3,045 (86.7) 
402 (11.4) 
6 (0.2) 
Agric'l imports of: 
consumer gcod3 
intermediate goods 
investment goods 
Net Private Capital Outflow -2,144 3,514 (100.0) 
— Figures in parentheses are percentage distribution of implicit 
tax among different components of outflows and inflows. 
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agriculture to the total tax collections (7%) at start of the 
16/ 
1970*s which will reach 13 percent if export taxes were included.— 
The explicit tax including the export taxes as a ratio of agricul-
tural value added amount to 7 percent while the same ratio for 
nan-agriculture is about 18 percent. Implicit-tax from price / 
intervention policies on domestic trade is conservatively estimated 
at 20 percent and hence total effective tax paid by agriculture 
is nearly 30 percent of agricultural value added. The implicit 
tax paid by agriculture is a direct resource transfer to consumers 
of agricultural products and producers of non-agricultural commo-
dities purchased by the agricultural sector. It is therefore an 
implicit subsidy from the point of view of non-agriculture. The 
total effective tax (net of this implicit subsidy) as a ratio of 
value added in non-agriculture is then on the average only about 
3 percent, though this may be quite different across the various 
non-agricultural sub-sector. Compared to this then, the agricul-
r 
tural sector is excessively taxed especially when we consider the 
much lower per capita income in agriculture compared to non-agri-
culture, 
— 
— This excludes the part of the negative protection on exports 
of coconut, sugar, and logs due to the coconut levy, pricing on 
sugar, log export ban where no revenues accrue to the government 
but are nevertheless implicit taxes paid by producers that are not 
included in the estimate of implicit tax on domestic trade. 
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On the other hand* it ia possible that the agricultural * 
sector has received the benefits from proportionately mere of 
public expenditures. Sough estimates indicate this possibility 
when sectoral allocators for aajor general expenditures such as 
defense, education, health and infrastructure are based on 
agriculture' s share in eaployraent and ipccsie. This procedure 
may, however, overstate the benefits received by agriculture. 
Moreover, even benefits considered to be directly received by 
agriculture such as irrigation, extension and research do not 
fully accrue to agriculture. By raising productivity they help 
to keep agriculture prices low, because o£ relatively Inelastic 
demand, and thereby benefit non-sgricultural consumers. 
In any case, when we sdd the implicit tax from price inter-
vention policies the result remains a positive net capital out-
flow from agricultural sven i£ we treat de Leon's government 
expenditure estimates as an additional inflow. This can be seen 
from Table 19, where the expenditure estimates are in column (2) 
and the net capital flews before consideration of the implicit 
tax are shown in the last column. The implicit tax was estimated 
for 1974 at about ?3.5 billion, which exceeds the highest value 
of capital inflow (also for 1974) calculated without the implicit 
tax. Since the price intervention system became even more adverse 
t<? agriculture after 1974, and the absolute value of the figures 
in the laat column decline rapidly after that year, we can 
51 
conclude that the net outflow including botii expenditure esciisates ^ 
and implicit tax was substantial lr. i.he 1970K. 
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Table iS - Net public and private capital outflows fro^ agricul-
tuTG. ,1957-1978 (in million pesos at constant 
prices) 
YEAR 
Gov't. 
Taxes 
(T
a
) 
C D 
Gov't. 
Expend-
itures 
CG
a
) 
(2) 
Met Public 
Flows 
(T
a
 - G
a
) 
(3) _ 
Net Private 
Flows 
(S
a
 - la) 
(4)+(3). 
Average 
1957-1966 213 1,927 
- 1,714 2,032 
318 
1967 232 2,520 
-2,238 1,950 -288* 
1968 23S 2,766 
-2,473 1,714 -764* 
1969 289 3,130 
-2,841 1,433 -1,353 
1970 302 2,982 
-2,680 1,562 -1,118* 
i97i 771 3,059 
-2,288 1,135 -1,103* 
1972 858 3,779 
-2,921 1,190 -1,731* 
1973 1,049 4 t 791 
-3,742 1,090 -2,651* 
1974 1,275 5,222 
-3,947 957 -2990 
1975 1,471 5,328 
-3,857 1,351 -2,506* 
1976 1,443 5,539 
-4,096 1,968 -2,128* 
1977 1,382 5,020 
-3,638 2,618 -1,020* 
1978 1,448 5,567 
-4,119 3,142 
-977 
^ T h e estimate for inbetween 1-0 years indicated by an asterisk 
are obtained by straightline interpolation of F . 
Sources of basic data: National budget reports of the Budget 
Commission CMinistry of the Budget) and GAO (COA), tocaranaa 
C1975)» World Bank (1976) and NED A , P V l u p i n e b U . i a t i c l 
Yearbook (Manila). 
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Intersactoral Capital -lows vs Labor Flows 
A rapid transfer of capital out of agriculture assy be economic-
ally efficient if this direction is towards more socially profitable 
investments. It may. also not have serious long-run negative conse- / 
quence on income distribution if the rate of capital outflow is at 
least aiatched by an equivalent rate of labor outflow. What has been 
the rate of labor outflows? 
By comparing the actual number ox agricultural workers with 
what the rubber would be without sectoral labor shifts (i.e., the 
" 7 / 
natural level.— a crude estimate of labor outflows from agriculture 
has been derived for selected years shown in Table 19 . Cumulative 
net labor inflows to agriculture were experienced before 1960, and 
in the early i970's. From the viewpoint of agricultural demand, 
this pattern is consistent with the sources of agricultural growth 
during this period. In the early postwar years, growth in agricul-
ture was explained mostly b e expansion of land under cultivation of 
which required substantial amounts /labor (David and Barker, 1979).. 
With the closing of the land frontier by the 1950's, agricultural ^ 
growth had to depend mainly on yield increases which isiplied a much 
—^Tha "natural" level is defined as the number of workers 
resulting only from births and dealths and in the labor fores 
participation rate. This turned out to be about 2.81 in the 
rural sector between 1957-1974. Later years were not considered 
becatise'of the significant changes in the survey procedures after 
1974, 
34 
Table 20 . Net labor flows and iiwt private capital flows between 
agriculture and non-agriculture, 1957-1?74. 
YEAR 
AGRI CULTURAL 
EMPLOYMENT 
NET 
FLOwS'' 
SET PRIVATE 
K FLOWS
d 
K FLOWS 
Natural 
(1000) 
Actual*
3 
(1000) 
Cumulative 
(1000) 
Cumulative 
(Million 3 
1972 Prices) 
L 5X0WS 
1957 
t ' r -i r 
, o / 5 4,397 —325 1,873 
1960 5,079 5,224 -145 7,481 - . 
1965 d , 331 5,725 106 13,277 182
e 
1971 6,882 6,321 561 27,873 5 4
a 
1974 7,476 7,684 -208 31,191 — 
Statural growth rate is assumed to be 2,8 per cant (see. de Leon 
1982b). 
^The reference month is October except for 1971 which is 
Hovember and 1974 (4tr. quarter). 
d e r i v e d as natural minus actual employment in agriculture. 
ote that the annual flows are two-year averages to account 
for the timing problem (labor surveys are done sometime in the 
year). 
^ a b o r outflow estimates are adjusted for portion absorbed by 
the government sector. Adjustment factor is the proportion of 
private employment to total eitployment. Note that net labor in-
flows are not adjusted since the government sector falls under non-
agriculture Csee text and footnote 39 for additional notes). 
Sources of basic data: NEDA, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 
Manila, 1980) and MCSO, Integrated Survey of Households 
(Manila, 19 ) for employment data. 
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lower labor absorption than in the previous period. Labor had to 
shift out of agriculture in the decade of the 1960'3. Though 
agricultural growth continued to be based on increasing product-
ivity on a limited land base, irrigation development by doubling 
and sometimes tripling cropping intensity together with the new 
seed fertilizer technology raised labor demand in rice. The 
generally utore favorable prices of major export crops at least 
in the early lS70's must have also contributed to the apparently 
higher labor demand. 
It should be emphasized, however, that labor demand in the 
nca-agricultural sector would be a more important determinant of 
intersectoral labor outflows because ' the level of labor p r o - ^ 
ductivity, average wage, and average family income is still much 
higher in this sector. Labor will voluntarily transfer to industry 
if there are job opportunities. The fact that a significant part 
of the growing labor force remains in agriculture indicates a 
limited demand for labor in industry. Previous studies have al-
ready documented the relatively capital intensive nature of in-
dustrialization that was promoted by the structure of government 
policies ( t t O , 1974). An estimate of the 1973 ILO Mission 
put the capital-labor ratio in all manufacturing at about ?23 
thousand per worker in 1969 prices. Our data show that even in 
years when the net labor outflow was positive the private capital 
outflow waa far greater than enough to match this capital labor 
ratio. 
It Is obvious then that the objective of accelerating the 
industrialization process by artificially depressing agricultural 
incentives will increase the factor share of capital relative to 
labor in the total economy and hence worsen income distribution. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Summary and Conclusions 
Prica Intervention policies in the broad sense, including 
industrial protection and exchange rate policies, have created 
an incentive structure that is significantly biased against 
agriculture." Before the 1970*3, this bias was due aainly tc the 
policy objective of promoting industrialisation via tariff 
protection. During the 197Q's, however, the agricultural sector 
became increasingly regulated leading, perhaps inadvertently, to 
an undervaluation of exportable products, especially sugar, 
coconuts, and logs, through export taxes, export quotas, special 
levies, and government monopoly of marketing. While prices of 
other agricultural products may not be substantially distorted, 
protection of manufactured inputs has introduced some measure of 
disincentive effect on their production. In contrast there are 
examples of substantial penalties on agricultural rav materials, 
depressing their prices more than enough to cffset^ the 
penalty imposed by economic policies on agricultural processing. 
JWAt^hiie^penalty imposed on agriculture by the overvaluation of 
the peso has also been shown to be substantial and even a partial 
& 
correction this by foreign exchange adjustments have had a dramatic 
impact on agricultural terms of trade. Distortions in the price of 
ss 
foreign exchange have been due both to the overall protection 
system and the tendency to delay foreign exchange adjustments 
to correct balance of payments disequilibrium. 
Credit policies mainly through interest rata subsidies have ^ 
net *i$»ificantly altered the unfavorable economic incentives in 
agriculture caused by price intervention policies. Credit quotas^ 
and special credit programs have not prevented the decline in real 
loanable funds to agriculture in the 1970's. Borrowers allocate 
additional liquidity to activities where sarginal profits or 
utility are highest, and cheap credit cannot overcome the dis- ^ 
advantage of depressed prices and profitability. 
Public expenditure policies, however have tended to promote 
agriculture, particularly through extension, research, and irriga-
tion development, all of which increase agricultural productivity. 
Expenditures on infrastructure in general will also benefit agri-
culture by expanding markets. Though these public expenditures 
have been concentrated in rice in the past, the emphasis in recent 
years has shifted to noii-rice agricultural scctors. 
The policy structure affecting agriculture is primarily 
Influenced by the general objective of promoting industrialization. 
The basic problem is not in the objective but in the set of policy 
instruments used to attain this objective. Artificially depressing 
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agricultural prices to raise the profitability of the industrial 
sector will have negative long-run consequences cn agricultural 
production and thus cn the objectives of food self-sufficiency» 
increasing exports, and improving income distribution. Farmers ^ 
are price responsive. Other studies have indicated that public 
investments and technological developments in agriculture nave 
in part been induced by higher agricultural prices. 
Constraining the growth of agriculture will also limit the ^ 
speed of industrialization since the agricultural sector by its 
sheer size will continue to be an important source of capital, 
foreign exchange, and food for this effort, as well as a potential 
source of market demand for its products. Indeed, tbe analysis 
of comparative adv&atage iudicates that agriculture in general 
offsrs socially profitable opportunities for providing these 
resources. This comparative advantage would be more effective in 
the absence ox these policy biases. Price intervention policies, 
therefore, have led to inefficient resource allocation and hence 
lower economic growth. Moreover, while we have made no attempt 
to quantify the income distribution effect of theae policies, it ^ 
is perhaps fair to comment that subsidizing industrialization and 
erban consumption through implicit taxation of agriculture repre-
sents an additional burden on a sector that is characterized by 
re£at4.vely low per capita incore. 
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The policy Implication of our analysis is not simply to ^ 
increase protection in agriculture hut to reduce distortions 
created by economic policies in general. The oread reforms in 
the tariff and interest rate policies currently being instituted 
have a potentially favorable impact on the agricultural sector. 
The general reduction in tariff protection in manufacturing 
coupled with the policy of letting the peso float will reduce 
somewhat the extent of the bias against agriculture. Reforms in 
the financial system, including a more flexible interest rate 
policy may allow more financial resources to flow into agriculture. 
These reforms will improve the global economic policy climate for 
agriculture. 
Turning to sector specific price intervention policies, we / 
note that these have often been directed toward aims that, in 
themselves, are commendable. Among these are the promotion of 
processing or other use of raw agricultural products, the provision 
of food and other necessities to the poor at relatively low and 
stable prices, and the strengthening of the country's bargaining 
position In international trade. To these ends the government has 
imposed export taxes and quotas, various price control measures 
and, in some cases, government iftonopoly of marketing. The effect
 y 
has generally been to depress agricultural prices» thereby harming 
incentives to production and reducing incomes of a large proportion 
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of the nation's poor families. What needs to be emphasized is that 
there are more efficient and more equitable ways cf pursuing these 
objectives. 
Consider first the processing or use in manufacture of raw 
agricultural products — e.g.
t
 converting copra into coconut oil, 
corn into meat products, or raw cotton into textiles. These 
manufacturing activities can be subsidized directly through fiscal 
incentives of the BOX sort, instead of by depressing prices to 
farmers. There are two principal advantages of this alternative 
policy. First, the disincentive to production of the raw product 
is eliminated; and, second, the burden of the subsidy 13 borne by 
the general tax payer, rather than by poor farmers. There is a 
gain in both efficiency and equity. 
With regard to the aims of providing cheap food and say, 
cooking oil, again it is not clear why the burden of sobsidizing 
the urban poor should be borne by the rural poor. Furthermore, 
the urban rich gain along with the poor under the present system. 
A preferable alternative policy would emphasize subsidies to agri- ' 
cultural production to keep food supplies abundant, thereby bene-
fitting both rural and urban poor, again at the expense of the 
general taxpayer, though the latter would also gain as consumer. 
* Strengthening the country's position in international trade 
is another policy objective th*t has led to mora government inter-
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verities, specifically In directly taking over marketing though 
this may not be the only motive for its control of marketing. 
The case for this is, we think, rather weak. The Philippines ' 
is not in a position to influence world prices for even its major 
exports in the long run. To the extent that some degree of 
monopoly power exists, the ideal policy would be an export tax 
equal to the reciprocal of the estimated world demand elasticity 
for the product. An unfortunate by-product of the government's 
attempt to attain monopoly power in world ^ markets has in some cases 
been the attainment of very substantial monopsony power. « * » n u t 
and c o t t w , there is w e a l s * a very strong i n d i c a t e that *his 
power has been used to depress prices to the farmer. 
In the case of the government marketing of rice and c o m 
two *f the most important agricultural products in agriculture, 
our studies indicate that in recent years domestic prices have 
been near border for both food grains. A key determinant of the 
domestic price of rice is the government's decision about the 
level of exports, while its import decision plays a key role 
in determining the domestic price of c o m . Evidently, however, 
the government does not take into account in making these 
decisions the undervaluation of foreign exchange that is due to 
both industrial protection and balance of payments disequilibrium. 
* This should seem surprising, since the government elsewhere in 
93 
its decision making is perfectly willing to place a premium 
011 earning or saving foreign exchange. This is sees, in the 
set of EOT incentives, in the price differential allowance for 
domestic components in the automobile industry, and in aieny 
other instances where the government indicates that it under-
stands the real social value of foreign exchange. That it does ^ 
net apply this in its own decisions in its monopoly control of 
rice and c o m exports and imports i« indicative of the govern-
2 a a t ' a unwillingness to treat agriculture on par with 
manufacturing, tourism and shipping, as foreign exchange earners 
and savers. 
What would be a 3±ailar policy toward rice and corn, taking 
into account the premium that should be attached to foreign 
exchange? Rice exports should be expanded and corn imports 
reduced (gradually, of course, as supply responds to price) until 
both domestic prices are 20 percent above border prices, this 
being the minimum estimate of the proportion by which the peso is 
overvalued. Failure to do this means keeping the domestic prices / 
of rice and corn below thsir social values. We hasten to add that 
these domestic prices are prices to producers, which could be 
accompanied by subsidies to consumers to l^eep prices at present 
levels. Again, as above, the argument is the same. It is better ^ 
from the stand point of incentives to production and equity in income 
t * 
distribution to keep food and feed cheap in this way, rather than 
by depressing prices to farmers. 
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Tills approach, of course, simply tries to correct the 
distortionary impact of economic policies i>n domestic pro-
duction of food staples and to satisfy the objective of keeping 
food and feed cheap. While a 20 perce-nt protection rate is 
conservative compared to industrial iprotaczion, the absolute 
amount of the subsidy required to maintain a cheap staple 
policy would be tremendous up to about one fourth of the govern-
ment budget. Limiting this subsidy to the poor segment of society 
(e.g., only c o m for food and not for feeds) will reduce this "out 
there may be difficult problems of enfcrcssant. The government 
has to some limited extent reduce this penalty by input subsi-
dies but whether through inputs or output subsidies, it Is not 
likely that the government can manage to gffset the penalties 
due to foreign exchange rate distortions. It 13 therefore neces-
sary to adjust quickly to balanca of payments disequilibrium and 
to reduce tariff protection on manufacturing tc minimise the heavy 
penalty received by agriculture from an overvalued peso. 
There are other important issues related to the growing 
nationalization of marketing of agricultural crops that has gone 
/ 
./ beyond staple foods. This typically tyis redueed instead of ^ 
increased competition. With le3s Incentive to minimize the unit 
coat of marketing, service to buyer3 and sellers will likely be 
leas efficient. The private sector has also expressed concern 
labotit the uncertainties introduced by this system since it is 
easier to arbitrarily change prices. It has also provided a 
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means for raising implicit taxes that are difficult to account 
for and are mere arbitrarily allocated. Government marketing ^ 
monopolies may also hamper market adjustments to new economic 
opportunities. For example, government monopoly in rice expor-
ting prevents the quality premiums in world prices from being 
reflected in the domestic market. Rice farmers and millers, 
therefore, have no incentive to produce rice with low percentage 
of brokers, limiting profitable exports. Domestic prices do not 
differentiate quality by this standard. The marginal cost of 
achieving better quality rice may be lowered by simply allowing 
private traders to export.-
Finally, if the alternative policy approach set out above 
were adopted, the total taxation of agriculture, both explicit 
and implicit would be considerably reduced. This is beneficial 
insofar as disincentives to efficient production are reduced and 
obvious inequities are mitigated. Agriculture should, however, 
pay its share of the cost of g o v e n u w n t services and this is 
likely to require some strengthening of income and land tax 
collection as part of an overall reform. In other words, the 
above arguments have not intended to imply that agriculture was 
overtaxed oar se; but ra ther that the means by which agriculture 
was taxed were inefficient and inequitable. Our study did not 
extend into the area of tax reforms, but this would represent one 
•* * 
of the logical extension of this research* 
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